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Not Just Kid Stuff? Extending Graham and
Miller to Adults
Michael M. O’Hear

*

I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court of the United States’ recent decisions in Graham v.
Florida1 and Miller v. Alabama2 are plainly milestones in the field of juvenile
justice, but do they also point the way to expanded Eighth Amendment protections for adult defendants? In Graham, the Court prohibited sentences of
life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for juveniles convicted of nonhomicide offenses.3 The holding raises the question of whether
there should be parallel Eighth Amendment limitations on the ability of a
state to sentence adults to LWOP for nonhomicide offenses. Then, in Miller,
the Court prohibited mandatory LWOP sentences for juveniles convicted of
homicide; the majority held that the sentencing judge must be free to consider
the juvenile offender’s age as a mitigating factor on a case-by-case basis.4
This raises the question of whether there should be any similar requirement
mandating the individualized, discretionary sentencing of adults.
In this Article, I consider the prospects for extending Graham and Miller
to adults. I assume that, in the normal spirit of constitutional adjudication, the
Supreme Court and lower courts will be – and should be – open to extending
the decisions to new cases presenting reasonably analogous considerations,
taking into account the holdings of earlier Eighth Amendment decisions and
the general approach to judging associated with our common law traditions.5
* Professor, Marquette University Law School. Author, Life Sentences Blog.
B.A., J.D. Yale University. I am grateful to Ryan Scoville, Paul Litton, Amy BaronEvans, and Paul Hofer for comments on an earlier draft, and to Robert Steele for
outstanding research assistance.
1. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
2. 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
3. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034.
4. Miller, 132. S. Ct. at 2475.
5. Cf. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992) (“The
inescapable fact is that adjudication of substantive due process claims may call upon
the Court in interpreting the Constitution to exercise the same capacity which by
tradition courts always have exercised: reasoned judgment.”). To be sure, my common law approach to understanding the Eighth Amendment in light of the Court’s
precedent stands in opposition to originalist approaches, which some Justices would
clearly prefer. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 975 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
announcing judgment of Court) (“[T]he ultimate question is . . . what [the] meaning
[of cruel and unusual punishment] was to the Americans who adopted the Eighth
Amendment.”). The original meaning of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause

File: O’Hear – Final Formatting 3/13/14

1088

Created on: 3/19/2014 8:58:00 AM

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

Last Printed: 3/19/2014 8:59:00 AM

[Vol. 78

The Court’s earlier decisions, however, are a mixed bag, which makes it
difficult to offer firm conclusions about the meaning and significance of Graham and Miller. The central challenge is this: Graham and Miller differ
markedly in spirit and analytical methodology from the Court’s two prior
decisions on the constitutionality of noncapital sentences, yet Graham and
Miller did not overturn the earlier decisions or even offer particularly convincing grounds for distinguishing them. In Harmelin v. Michigan, the Court
upheld a mandatory LWOP sentence for a drug crime.6 Then, in Ewing v.
California, the Court upheld California’s draconian “three-strikes” law as
applied to a defendant whose third strike was for a trivial shoplifting offense.7
Despite their minimalist approach to Eighth Amendment protections, Harmelin and Ewing were recognized as good law in Graham8 and Miller,9 so
any account of the latter two decisions must show how they can be reconciled
with the former.
In the end, I do not think it possible to fit these decisions together as the
expression of a single, overarching principle. Rather, the decisions reflect an
ad hoc, but not entirely incoherent, balancing of four ideals: (1) proportionality in punishment; (2) judicial deference to legislative policy choices and state
court judgments; (3) social reintegration of offenders; and (4) individualized,
discretionary sentencing. As the Court developed these concepts in Graham
and Miller, they do not provide much basis for sweeping reversals of adult
LWOP sentences. On the other hand, Graham and Miller may provide a basis for relief for various specific categories of adult offenders, either in the

is a complex topic lying beyond the scope of this Article. For a recent assessment of
the history that provides some originalist support for robust proportionality review,
see John F. Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality Under the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause, 97 VA. L. REV. 899 (2011). In some respects, particularly its
emphasis on culpability, Stinneford’s historically grounded approach to proportionality review dovetails with the approach that I describe in Part II below as emerging
from Graham and Miller. See id. at 972 (“If the punishment is unjustly harsh in light
of the defendant’s culpability, it is cruel.”).
6. 501 U.S. at 961, 996.
7. 538 U.S. 11, 18, 30-31 (2003). On the same day as Ewing, the Court also
decided Lockyer v. Andrade, another case affirming a California three-strikes sentence. 538 U.S. 63, 77 (2003). Unlike Ewing, Lockyer was a habeas case, and its
disposition was controlled by the federal habeas statute. Id. at 71 (“In this case, we do
not reach the question whether the state court erred and instead focus solely on
whether [28 U.S.C.] § 2254(d) forecloses habeas relief on Andrade’s Eighth Amendment claim.”). As a result, I do not consider Lockyer to be a central part of the Eighth
Amendment “canon,” and I do not discuss it further here.
8. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022 (“The approach in cases such as Harmelin
and Ewing is suited for considering a gross proportionality challenge to a particular
defendant’s sentence . . . .”).
9. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2470 (“Our ruling thus neither overrules nor undermines nor conflicts with Harmelin.”).
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form of an LWOP prohibition for certain kinds of cases (a Graham remedy)10
or a requirement for an individualized, discretionary process before LWOP
can be imposed (a Miller remedy).11
In further developing these points, the Article proceeds as follows. Part
II more fully unpacks the central jurisprudential values that animate Graham
and Miller. By reference to these values, Part III explains how Graham and
Miller may be reconciled with Harmelin and Ewing. Finally, Part IV discusses the application of Graham and Miller to one particular category of adult
offenders – those sentenced under the three-strikes provision of 21 U.S.C. §
841(b)(1)(A) – and concludes that at least some of these offenders may have
viable Eighth Amendment claims.

II. MAKING SENSE OF GRAHAM AND MILLER
Graham and Miller are centrally concerned with the ideal of proportionality in punishment, but neither opinion is structured as simply an open-ended
inquiry into the excessiveness of a challenged sentence. Rather, the proportionality analysis of both opinions seems conditioned by a set of collateral
considerations – considerations that may influence the rigor of the proportionality analysis and the Court’s choice of remedies. These considerations
include ideals relating to judicial deference, the reintegration of offenders into
society, and discretionary, individualized sentencing.
This Part first explores the proportionality analysis of Graham and
Miller, and then describes the role played by the conditioning considerations.
It concludes that the Court may be heading toward a sliding-scale approach to
Eighth Amendment review, similar to that which it uses in other areas of constitutional jurisprudence.

A. Proportionality
Graham and Miller are explicitly premised on the belief that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits disproportionately harsh punishments. As the Court
put it in Graham: “Embodied in the Constitution’s ban on cruel and unusual
punishments is the precept of justice that punishment for crime should be
graduated and proportioned to the offense.”12 Thus, the Court has banned
various sentencing practices “based on mismatches between the culpability of
a class of offenders and the severity of the penalty.”13 This Section discusses
the basic structure of the “mismatch” analysis in Graham and Miller, unpacks
the factors that the Court has particularly used to assess culpability, and final10. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034.
11. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2475.
12. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2021 (alterations in original omitted) (quoting Weems

v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
13. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463 (citing Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022-23).

File: O’Hear – Final Formatting 3/13/14

1090

Created on: 3/19/2014 8:58:00 AM

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

Last Printed: 3/19/2014 8:59:00 AM

[Vol. 78

ly considers the role of utilitarian purposes of punishment (deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation) in the Court’s reasoning.

1. Basic Structure of the Analysis: Categorical, Ordinal Ranking of
Offenses and Penalties
Despite the popularity of glib proportionality formulae like “an eye for
eye,” it is not at all clear how to translate a given level of offense severity into
a particular sentence, especially when the sentence is a term of imprisonment.
The units of measure for offense severity and punishment severity seem
wholly incommensurable. Contemporary proportionality theory has met the
problem by adopting an ordinal, as opposed to a cardinal, orientation; that is,
the most serious category of crime should be punished with the most serious
punishment, the second-most serious category of crime should be punished
with the second-most serious punishment, and so forth.14
This logic seems very much in line with Graham’s approach to proportionality. Thus, for instance, Graham tells us that nonhomicide offenders
must not be exposed to the worst punishment available to murderers – that is,
the death penalty – because nonhomicide offenders are categorically less
culpable than murderers.15 Likewise, in light of the various deliberation- and
character-related considerations to be discussed below, “when compared to an
adult murderer, a juvenile offender who did not kill or intend to kill has a
twice diminished moral culpability.”16 This calls for punishment that is also
at least twice diminished, or, in other words, for something less than
LWOP.17 Conceptually speaking, it is easy to imagine this “degrees-ofdiminution” formula being extended in various ways; for instance, by prohibiting a twice-diminished punishment (relative to the death penalty) from being imposed in cases of thrice-diminished culpability (relative to adult homicide).18 This categorical, ordinal approach provides the basic structure of the
proportionality analysis under Graham and Miller.
14. Michael M. O’Hear, Beyond Rehabilitation: A New Theory of Indeterminate
Sentencing, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1247, 1255-56 (2011) (citing Andrew von Hirsch,
Penal Theories, in THE HANDBOOK OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 659, 668 (Michael
Tonry ed., 1998)).
15. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2027.
16. Id.
17. See id.
18. To be sure, although this approach is conceptually straightforward enough,
there might be important practical difficulties in deciding where to draw the lines; for
instance, should a sentence of life with parole eligibility after fifty years be treated
like LWOP as once diminished, or should it be regarded as categorically less severe?
Does the answer depend on the age and health of the defendant? On the liberality of
the parole standards and practices of the jurisdiction? It seems that there must necessarily be some arbitrariness around the margins in the line-drawing process; such
practical difficulties, however, should not necessarily lead the courts to abandon any
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2. Culpability Factors
If the proportionality analysis requires a culpability-based comparison
between the offender before us and an adult murderer, we must have some
criteria for assessing culpability. Although the Court has not set forth such
criteria in a systematic fashion, we can infer a workable list from the reasoning of Graham and other Eighth Amendment decisions.
a. Harm
The Court has emphasized the importance of harm in distinguishing the
culpability of different classes of offenders, particularly in distinguishing
between those guilty of homicide and those guilty of lesser crimes. Graham
put it this way:
There is a line between homicide and other serious violent offenses against the individual. Serious nonhomicide crimes may
be devastating in their harm but in terms of moral depravity and
of the injury to the person and to the public, they cannot be
compared to murder in their severity and irrevocability. This is
because life is over for the victim of the murderer, but for the
victim of even a very serious nonhomicide crime, life is not
over and normally is not beyond repair. Although an offense
like robbery or rape is a serious crime deserving serious punishment, those crimes differ from homicide crimes in a moral
sense.19
Thus, although proportionality theorists are divided on the question of
whether resulting harm should matter in assessing offense gravity,20 the Court
seems to have embraced harm as a key consideration.21
effort to extend Graham’s categorical-proportionality logic beyond juvenile LWOP.
Indeed, Graham itself created various difficult line-drawing problems even in the
juvenile LWOP area, for instance, with respect to the question of what it means for
juvenile offenders to be given some “realistic opportunity to obtain release.” See
generally Gerard Glynn & Ilona Vila, What States Should Do to Provide a Meaningful Opportunity for Review and Release: Recognize Human Worth and Potential, 24
ST. T. L. REV. 310, 314 (2012). There would be few principles of justice left standing
if courts limited themselves to those that could be enforced without engaging in any
contestable line-drawing.
19. 130 S. Ct. at 2027 (alterations in original omitted) (citations omitted) (quoting Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 438 (2008); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S.
782, 797 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
20. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson, The A.L.I.’s Proposed Distributive Principle
of “Limiting Retributivism”: Does It Mean in Practice Anything Other than
Pure Desert?, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 3, 13 (2003) (“[P]eople disagree about
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b. Intent and Deliberation
In addition to the objective harm done, the Court also sees the defendant’s subjective state as an important aspect of culpability. This seems to
include the traditional criminal law concept of “intent.” For instance, while
the Court sometimes seems to define the most serious culpability category
exclusively by reference to resulting harm (as in the previously quoted passage), at other times the Court discusses the homicide category more broadly
as also encompassing those who merely “intend to kill” or even “foresee that
life will be taken.”22 The suggestion seems to be that a sufficiently blameworthy state of mind may elevate the seriousness of a crime beyond what
would normally be expected based solely on the objective harm. If so, the
converse might also be true – that is, an offender might not be held fully accountable for a harm that was neither intended nor foreseen.23
While intent and knowledge do seem important to the culpability calculus, the Court has also suggested a broader view of what counts in an evaluation of the offender’s state of mind, including a constellation of factors that
might collectively be labeled “deliberation.”24 The Court seems to be asking
to what extent the offender’s actions reflected a free, informed, and carefully
considered choice to do wrong. Thus, various deliberation-related impairments specific to juveniles played a prominent role in justifying the Court’s
decisions in Graham and Miller. Citing Graham and Roper v. Simmons, the
Court summarized its reasoning this way in Miller:

what affects blameworthiness. The most dramatic example I can think of is that some
people think that resulting harm ought to increase punishment while others think it
ought not and that the focus should be only on things like one's conduct, culpability,
and capacities.”).
21. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 819-20 (1991). The Court has also embraced the relevance of harm to culpability in its leading decision on the admissibility
of victim impact evidence. Id. I’m grateful to Paul Litton for reminding me of this.
22. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2027.
23. The relative weight to ascribe to harm and intent has been a subject of
considerable debate among punishment theorists. Michael Moore suggests that we
ought to think about the relationship this way: the subjective aspects of culpability
(which he labels simply “culpability”) are both necessary and sufficient for punishment; however, when these are present, the harm (“wrongdoing”) “independently
influences how much punishment is deserved.” MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME:
A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 193 (1997). “Indeed . . . the amount of
wrong done may often swamp the degree of culpability with which it is done as the
major determinant of how much punishment is deserved.” Id. This approach seems
consistent with the Court’s discussion of proportionality in Graham, although the
Court’s analysis is sufficiently imprecise that it would be unwise to assume that it
intends to endorse any particular systematic theory of proportionality. See Graham,
130 S. Ct. at 2021-22.
24. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569-70 (2005).
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Because juveniles have diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform, . . . they are less deserving of the most severe
punishments. [Prior] cases relied on three significant gaps between juveniles and adults. First, children have a lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility, leading to
recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking. Second,
children are more vulnerable to negative influences and outside
pressures, including from their family and peers; they have limited control over their own environment and lack the ability to
extricate themselves from horrific, crime-producing settings.
And third, a child’s character is not as well formed as an
adult’s; his traits are less fixed and his actions less likely to be
evidence of irretrievable depravity.25
On such grounds, Graham was able to conclude that a “juvenile is not
absolved of responsibility for his actions, but his transgression is not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult”;26 hence, “because juveniles have lessened culpability they are less deserving of the most severe punishments.”27
c. Character
The Court’s discussion of deliberation-related factors bleeds into another dimension of proportionality review – the offender’s character. Note, for
instance, the third “gap” in the preceding quotation from Miller, which suggests that juveniles should be regarded as less culpable because their crimes
are less likely to serve as reliable “evidence of irretrievable depravity.”28
This seems a conceptually distinct inquiry from questions like how much
harm was done and with what state of mind.
Emphasizing character is an idiosyncratic move by the Court.29 In contemporary punishment theory, culpability and proportionality are more typically thought of in relation to a specific voluntary act and not as a function of
characteristics intrinsic to the offender’s person.30 For example, we are
25. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012) (alterations in original
omitted) (citations omitted) (quoting Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026; Roper, 543 U.S. at
569, 570) (internal quotation marks omitted).
26. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026 (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815,
835 (1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
27. Id. (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 569).
28. 132 S. Ct. at 2464 (alteration in original omitted) (quoting Roper, 543 U.S.
at 570).
29. See, e.g., MOORE, supra note 23, at 191 (“The concept of responsibility presupposed by Anglo-American criminal law is one whereby . . . persons . . . are responsible for their choices (not their characters).”).
30. See, e.g., id.; MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962)
(“A person is not guilty of an offense unless his liability is based on conduct that
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commonly told to condemn the sin, not the sinner; as such, it may seem unfair
and illiberal to punish based on who the offender is rather than what the offender has done. Yet, for Eighth Amendment purposes the Court indicated
that it considers “the culpability of the offenders at issue in light of their
crimes and characteristics.”31
At noncapital sentencing, offender characteristics are normally
addressed not in connection with culpability, which is a moral judgment, but
in an effort to assess dangerousness: does the offender require simple incapacitation, or can the offender be expected to respond favorably to rehabilitative treatment? Yet Graham spoke of character in unmistakably moral terms.
For instance, the Court observed that “from a moral standpoint[,] it would
be misguided to equate the failings of a minor with those of an adult, for
a greater possibility exists that a minor’s character deficiencies will be
reformed.”32 Indeed, the key words chosen by the Court in Graham and
Miller – words like “character,” “depravity,” and “corruption” – have a
distinctly moral valence, especially in comparison with more technocratic
phrases, such as “risk assessment” or “likelihood of recidivism,” that might
have been used instead.33
Although it may be unusual to treat character as an aspect of culpability
or proportionality, the Court would not be entirely alone or beyond justification in doing so. An established Aristotelian, or “aretaic,” tradition of
thinking about punishment focuses on character in ways that share something
of the same spirit as Graham and Miller.34 In the words of Professor Kyron
includes a voluntary act or the omission to perform an act of which he is physically
capable.”).
31. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026 (citing Roper. 543 U.S. at 568) (emphasis added); see also Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463 (referring to “precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated . . . to both the offender and the offense” (emphasis added) (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 568) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
32. 130 S. Ct. at 2026-27 (alteration in original omitted) (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting Roper. 543 U.S. at 568) (internal quotation marks omitted).
33. Although Miller borrows the moralistic phraseology from Graham, the more
recent opinion does not as clearly treat the character question as an aspect of culpability. For instance, in explaining why juveniles are less deserving of the most severe
punishments, Miller observed that its “findings – of transient rashness, proclivity for
risk, and inability to assess consequences – both lessened a child’s moral culpability
and enhanced the prospect that, as the years go by and neurological development
occurs, his deficiencies will be reformed.” Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464-65 (emphasis
added) (quoting Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2027) (internal quotation marks omitted). This
language suggests that culpability assessment is to be regarded as a separate consideration from whether the offender’s character deficiencies are likely to be reformed.
Still, whether or not Miller contemplates that character goes to culpability, there is no
question that Miller treats character, or something much like it, as part of the proportionality calculus. See id. at 2467.
34. For a general discussion of the aretaic theory of punishment, see Kyron Huigens, Homicide in Aretaic Terms, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 97, 98-99 (2002).
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Huigens, a leading exponent of this view, the aretaic theory of punishment
“takes the principal justifying purpose of punishment to be the inculcation
of virtue”35 – that is, “a capacity for sound practical judgment, both on
the occasion of action and in the assembly and maintenance of one’s system
of ends and standing motivations.”36 On this view, a finding of criminal fault
is “an inference . . . to the effect that the defendant’s practical reasoning
is flawed or deficient.”37 Criminal fault, thus understood, is punished because
“we bear a responsibility to others to conceive and pursue our ends in a
way that promotes the greater good. Defining the good and determining ends
are acts over which we maintain some control and upon which the wellbeing of others depends.”38 Such a line of thinking may provide a plausible
justification for the Court’s suggestion that character is a subject fit for
culpability judgments.39

3. Downplaying of Utilitarian Purposes
As the Court observed in Graham, culpability is typically seen as the
particular concern of retributive approaches to punishment.40 In theory, however, punishments that are excessive relative to culpability might nonetheless
effectively serve utilitarian crime-control ends through deterrence, incapacitation, or rehabilitation. Under Graham and Miller, these utilitarian purposes
Id. at 99.
Id. at 98.
Id. at 107.
Id. at 117.
Moreover, the aretaic theory also provides a basis for limiting penal severity
insofar as punishment bears on the virtue of the “punishing majority”: as we punish,
we must acknowledge that the way we do so defines our own character. Id. at 120-21.
It would be hypocrisy, for instance, for us to punish a defendant for failing to make a
selfless choice that we would not be willing to make either. Id. at 121. Likewise, as
Huigens argues, ours would be “a brutal society instead of an enlightened one” were
we to punish a defendant whose mental illness deprived him of the ability to “assess
and govern his own conduct.” Id.
Analogous reasoning may underlie the Court’s treatment of juvenile status
in Graham and Miller. We might say, for instance, that punishment of juveniles must
be moderated because we were all young and foolish once, with deficient practical
reasoning, and there would be a certain flavor of hypocrisy not to recognize that
at sentencing. Moreover, the juvenile does not have a fully developed capacity to
assess and govern his own conduct, and there does seem something brutal about
punishing him as if he did. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012).
Finally, young people are not yet full-fledged, autonomous members of our society,
and as such we should not expect them to shoulder an adult level of responsibility. In
sum, a young person’s crime simply does not carry the same social significance as
that of an adult.
40. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2028 (2010) (quoting Tison v. Arizona,
481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987)).
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
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have a role to play in the Eighth Amendment analysis, but the role is uncertain and seems secondary to the culpability considerations described above.
For instance, in describing its general approach to the Eighth Amendment, the Graham Court indicated that it would assess the “culpability of
the offenders at issue in light of their crimes and characteristics,” but then
added that it would “also consider[] whether the challenged sentencing practice serves legitimate penological goals.”41 The Court thus seemed to indicate
that the moral fit between culpability and punishment alone was not the
be-all and end-all of the Eighth Amendment analysis; however, it did not
elaborate on how precisely the broader assessment of penological goals might
affect its reasoning.42
Still, the Court did make clear that utilitarian benefits would not necessarily save an otherwise-disproportionate sentence. Thus, the Court acknowledged the possibility of deterrence benefits from juvenile LWOP but concluded, “Here, in light of juvenile nonhomicide offenders’ diminished moral
responsibility, any limited deterrent effect provided by life without parole is
not enough to justify the sentence.”43 The Court seemed to reach a similar
conclusion as to incapacitation.44
The Court may have a sliding-scale approach in mind, which might
work in ways that parallel the constitutional analysis in other areas of law.
For instance, when a sentence does not appear disproportionate relative to
culpability, the Court might employ a deferential rational basis review to
determine whether the sentence is penologically justified. However, when a
sentence is excessive relative to culpability, a more rigorous approach to judicial review might be appropriate.45 This seems at least roughly consistent
with the reasoning in Graham.46
Id. at 2026.
See id. at 2028.
Id. at 2029.
See id. (“Incapacitation cannot override all other considerations, lest the
Eighth Amendment’s rule against disproportionate sentences be a nullity.”). By contrast, the Court found no plausible rehabilitation benefits to LWOP. Id. at 2029-30.
Miller treated utilitarian goals in much the same way as Graham, giving such
goals little emphasis in comparison to proportionality. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465.
Indeed, in its general summary of the Eighth Amendment analysis, Miller made no
reference at all to the broader penological-goals test, but instead simply discussed
proportionality. Id. at 2463. On the other hand, as suggested above, Miller may have
reconceptualized proportionality so as to incorporate incapacitation- and rehabilitation-type concerns. See discussion supra note 33.
45. Cf. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579-80 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Laws such as economic or tax legislation that are scrutinized under rational
basis review normally pass constitutional muster . . . . We have consistently
held, however, that some objectives, such as ‘a bare . . . desire to harm a politically
unpopular group,’ are not legitimate state interests. When a law exhibits such a desire
to harm a politically unpopular group, we have applied a more searching form
of rational basis review to strike down such laws under the Equal Protection Clause.”
41.
42.
43.
44.
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(citations omitted)); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (“Where certain ‘fundamental rights’ are involved, the Court has held that regulation limiting these
rights may be justified only by a ‘compelling state interest,’ and that legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at
stake.” (citations omitted)).
46. The role of utilitarian considerations in the Eighth Amendment analysis has
been a matter of particular debate and uncertainty in both the Supreme Court decisions and the scholarly literature. See, e.g., Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right
Against Excessive Punishment, 91 VA. L. REV. 677 (2005). As Youngjae Lee has
observed, the Ewing plurality opinion rests on what he calls the “disjunctive theory,”
that is, the idea that a sentence survives Eighth Amendment review if it can be justified on the basis of any of the major purposes of punishment, even if it is excessive in
relation to all of the rest. Id. at 682. Lee argues that the disjunctive theory is “wrongheaded” and that the Eighth Amendment restriction on excessive punishment should
instead be understood as a retributively grounded “side constraint” on a state’s ability
to pursue the utilitarian purposes of punishment. Id. at 683. On this view, a punishment that goes beyond what is permitted by retributive proportionality might be unconstitutional, regardless of its deterrence and incapacitation benefits. Id. at 684.
Although the Court has not explicitly embraced this side constraint view, Lee observes – correctly, I think – that the Court’s recent Eighth Amendment decisions in
capital cases indicate that the Court no longer takes the disjunctive approach very
seriously. See Youngjae Lee, The Purposes of Punishment Test, 23 FED. SENT’G REP.
58, 58 (2010). Lee depicts Graham as an extension of this trend into the noncapital
arena. Id. at 59-60. He suggests that Graham may be pointing in the direction of a
new approach to Eighth Amendment analysis similar to the sliding scale I have described above. See id. at 60 (“If a punishment fails the culpability test, then the punishment is presumptively unconstitutional and a compelling reason is needed to overcome the presumption of unconstitutionality. That is, the Eighth Amendment right
against excessive punishment is defined by the retributivist constraint . . . but the right
is not absolute.” (emphasis in original)).
Richard Frase has suggested a somewhat different approach. He argues that
proportionality is not necessarily a retributive concept, but that three different approaches to proportionality should (and do) inform the determination of whether a
challenged punishment is permissible. Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences,
Punishment Goals, and the Eighth Amendment: “Proportionality” Relative to What?,
89 MINN. L. REV. 571, 575-76 (2005). The first approach, limiting retributivism,
employs retributive proportionality as a side constraint on punishment, as Lee proposed. Id. at 591. The second approach, ends disproportionality, considers whether
the punishment’s costs and burdens outweigh its likely benefits. Id. at 592. The third
and final approach, means proportionality, considers whether there are less costly or
burdensome means available to achieve the same benefits. Id. In Frase’s view, a
punishment would be unconstitutional if it was “grossly disproportionate” under any
of the three approaches to proportionality, subject to confirmation through intra- and
inter-state comparisons. Id. at 633-34. Consistent with this view, Frase finds in Graham some support for the idea that “retributive disproportionality might, by itself, be
a basis for finding a prison sentence to be in violation of the Eighth Amendment.”
Richard S. Frase, Graham’s Good News – and Not, FED. SENT’G REP. Oct. 2010, at
55. He also sees in Justice Kennedy’s analysis some implicit consideration of the two
nonretributive proportionality principles, but criticizes Kennedy for not expressly
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B. Conditioning Considerations
While proportionality seems to be the Court’s central concern in Graham and Miller, the Court’s analysis seems conditioned by a set of considerations that are only tangentially related to proportionality. The Court has not
precisely defined the role played by these considerations, but a careful reading of Graham and Miller does provide some sense of what the Court may
have in mind. This Section first assesses the Court’s treatment of a trio of
considerations that seem connected to the ideal of judicial deference, and then
turns to two additional considerations relating to the social reintegration of
offenders and individualized, discretionary sentencing.

1. Deference
The deference ideal demands respect for the work of legislatures and
lower courts, with an eye toward preserving the legitimacy of the judiciary
(which might be undermined, for instance, by starkly counter-majoritarian
decision making); the stability of law and legal judgments; the role of statelevel autonomy and experimentation in our federalist system of government;
and the comparative advantages of legislatures in making policy choices and
local trial judges in determining appropriate sentences in light of particular
community circumstances and values.47 Such ends are obviously disserved if
the Supreme Court issues sweeping Eighth Amendment decisions that overturn well-established laws or legal practices, especially when the decisions
are seen as a product of the idiosyncratic social values of five unelected Justices. The Court does make an effort to avoid such negative perceptions of its
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, albeit perhaps not as much of an effort as
some would like to see.
Reflecting such an effort, Graham and Miller devote considerable attention to a trio of deference-related variables: frequency of the challenged sentence in practice, extent of deliberate legislative support for the sentence, and
consistency of the sentence with international legal norms. Before describing

indicating “that the two nonretributive proportionality principles are independent of
each other, so that a violation of either principle can invalidate a proposed nonretributive punishment rationale.” Id. at 55-57. Thus, like Lee (and me), Frase thinks that
Graham leaves open the possibility that in some circumstances a retributively disproportionate sentence might be saved by a sufficiently compelling utilitarian justification – a possibility that Frase finds regrettable. Id. at 54.
47. Several of these points were expressly noted as important Eighth Amendment concerns in Justice Kennedy’s controlling opinion in Harmelin v. Michigan.
501 U.S. 957, 998-1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see also Michel M. O’Hear, Appellate Review of Sentences: Reconsidering
Deference, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2123, 2135-55 (2010) (discussing justifications
for deference by appellate courts to sentencing decisions made by trial court judges).
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these variables in more detail, though, it is helpful to appreciate that the discussions of deference are framed somewhat differently in the two cases.
Graham addressed deference through its determination that a “national
consensus” existed against juvenile LWOP for nonhomicide crimes.48 This
conclusion of a national consensus, however, seems far too strong based on
the available evidence, particularly, as the dissenters pointed out, in light of
the frequency with which legislatures have approved juvenile LWOP.49
Miller considered a similar body of evidence, but eschewed a “national
consensus” conclusion, speaking instead in a more open-ended way of
“objective indicia” of public attitudes.50 Perhaps this marks a turn away from
the misleading “national consensus” framework that the Court employed
in its earlier Eighth Amendment decisions.51 I follow Miller’s lead in
avoiding the language of “national consensus”; what the Court has really
been doing, I think, in its purported search for “consensus” has been assessing
the relative strength of the case for deference in light of the considerations
described below.
a. Frequency of the Challenged Sentence in Practice
In Graham, the most important deference consideration may have been
the infrequency of the challenged sentence (juvenile LWOP for nonhomicide
crimes). Indeed, the Court went to some pains to establish that only 123 “juvenile nonhomicide offenders” were serving LWOP sentences nationwide
when the case was decided.52 The number was particularly impressive in
light of the many tens of thousands of juveniles arrested each year for aggravated assault, robbery, and other serious offenses.53 Such infrequency in the
imposition of a challenged sentence makes clear that overturning the sentence
will not impose major disruptions on the day-to-day functioning of state criminal justice systems and also diminishes concerns that the Court is acting in a
starkly counter-majoritarian way.54
In contrast, Miller potentially affects a much higher number of sentences; at the time of the decision, the actual number of individuals serving mandatory LWOP for juvenile homicides apparently exceeded 2,000.55 Yet, even
for homicide, the Court found juvenile LWOP to be a rare and disfavored
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026.
Id. at 2048-50 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2470-71 (2012).
For another controversial use of the “national consensus” framework in addition to Graham, see Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 422-26 (2008).
52. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2024.
53. Id. at 2025.
54. Although neither the Court’s nor my approach to the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause has been particularly textual, the importance of infrequency
could also be justified through its natural connection to the term “unusual.”
55. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2477 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
48.
49.
50.
51.
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sentence based on data from jurisdictions in which juvenile LWOP was discretionary, noting “[t]hat figure indicates that when given the choice, sentencers impose life without parole on children relatively rarely. And . . . [the
Court has] held that when judges and juries do not often choose to impose a
sentence, it at least should not be mandatory.”56
b. Deliberate Legislative Support for the Sentence
Although precedent indicated that legislation was the “clearest and
most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values,”57 in Graham
and Miller the Court seemed to effectively reject this view. Indeed, Graham
overturned the law in thirty-nine U.S. jurisdictions including the federal
system and the District of Columbia, while Miller overturned the law in twenty-nine jurisdictions.58
In both cases, the Court downplayed the legislative evidence in light of
concerns that the legislation reflected a sort of inadvertence, rather than a
deliberate choice. As the Court observed in Miller:
Almost all jurisdictions allow some juveniles to be tried in
adult court for some kinds of homicide. But most States do
not have separate penalty provisions for those juvenile offenders. Of the 29 jurisdictions mandating life without parole
for children, more than half do so by virtue of generally applicable penalty provisions, imposing the sentence without
regard to age. And indeed, some of those States set no minimum age for who may be transferred to adult court in the first
instance, thus applying life-without-parole mandates to children of any age – be it 17 or 14 or 10 or 6. As in Graham, we
think that underscores that the statutory eligibility of a juvenile offender for life without parole does not indicate that the
penalty has been endorsed through deliberate, express, and
full legislative consideration.59
Of course, such an absence of deliberate choice undercuts the general
assumption that overturning legislation contravenes majoritarian preferences.

Id. at 2472 n.10.
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989).
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2471.
Id. at 2473 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted) (quoting Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
56.
57.
58.
59.
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c. Consistency with International Legal Norms
In addition to U.S. law and practice, Graham also looked to international legal norms, stating, “[T]he judgment of the world’s nations that a particular sentencing practice is inconsistent with basic principles of decency
demonstrates that the Court’s rationale has respected reasoning to support
it.”60 Although the Court’s citation of international norms in Eighth Amendment cases has proven controversial,61 this can be understood as a deferenceoriented device to help ensure that Eighth Amendment holdings are not merely the products of the idiosyncratic social values of five justices, but are instead in accord with widespread, objectively ascertainable human-rights
norms. Moreover, an inconsistency between state law and nearly universal
international norms may heighten suspicions that the state law did not result
from a deliberate, well-informed policy choice.
International legal norms thus join frequency in practice and deliberate
legislative choice as important factors in deciding how much deference to
give to a challenged sentence or sentencing law. Such a threshold determination might play a decisive role in the constitutional analysis in many – perhaps even most – cases, given the looseness of the proportionality test.62 In
other words, because there will often be room for reasonable minds to differ
over how many times “diminished” a given punishment or offender is from
the most serious, it will often be critical whether the analysis is undertaken
with a strong presumption in favor of the constitutionality of the challenged
sentence or law, a weak presumption, or no presumption at all.

2. Social Reintegration of Offenders
Among the conditioning considerations, the deference factors received
the most extensive and explicit treatment in Graham and Miller. However,
there do seem to be additional considerations that played a role in the Court’s
thinking. For instance, the Court’s proportionality analysis does not by itself
seem quite capable of justifying the breadth of the holding in Graham. Rather, the holding also seems to rest on a particular aversion to the sort of permanent social exclusion represented by LWOP.
Recall that the Graham Court adopted a flat prohibition on juvenile
LWOP for nonhomicide offenses.63 In so doing, the Court expressly rejected
the alternative that courts “take the offender’s age into consideration as part
of a case-specific gross disproportionality inquiry, weighing it against the

60. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034.
61. For a defense of this practice, see Jessica Olive & David Gray, A Modest

Appeal for Decent Respect, FED. SENT’G REP., Oct. 2010, at 72.
62. See discussion supra note 46.
63. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030.
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seriousness of the crime.”64 Although the Court conceded the possibility that
LWOP might indeed be an appropriate sentence for some juvenile nonhomicide offenders, the Court was not convinced that the decision could be made
with “sufficient accuracy.”65
The Court thus chose a categorical, prophylactic rule that eliminated the
risk of one type of error: the false positive (that is, an incorrect determination
that a juvenile nonhomicide offender deserves LWOP).66 At the same time,
the Court enhanced the risk of a different type of error: the false negative
(that is, an incorrect determination that a juvenile nonhomicide offender does
not deserve LWOP). If there are any cases in which a juvenile nonhomicide
offender actually deserves LWOP, which is a possibility that the Court did
not reject, then Graham guarantees erroneous – that is, disproportionately
lenient – sentences in those cases. Thus, Graham cannot be taken at face
value as a decision that is driven by concern for accuracy in proportionality
decisions. Rather, Graham trades off one type of risk of error for another,
implicitly revealing that one type of error is of more concern to the Court than
the other.
Why was Graham more concerned about false positives than false negatives? The Court first suggested that there might be systemic tendencies to
impose overly harsh sentences for juveniles. Quoting its earlier decision in
Roper v. Simmons, which banned the juvenile death penalty, the Court observed that an “unacceptable likelihood exists that the brutality or coldblooded nature of any particular crime would overpower mitigating arguments based on youth as a matter of course, even where the juvenile offender’s objective immaturity, vulnerability, and lack of true depravity should
require a sentence less severe than death.”67 Further exacerbating the risk of
error were the “special difficulties encountered by counsel in juvenile representation,” such as the tendency for juveniles to mistrust adults.68
Yet it is far from clear that juvenile status tends, on the whole, to create
a greater risk of false positives than false negatives. The majority in Graham
clearly appreciated that youth was a mitigating factor, and there is no
reason to think that the justices on the Supreme Court are possessed of some
special moral sensitivity that is not shared by judges in lower sentencing
courts. Indeed, the very rarity of juvenile LWOP sentences that seemed so
important in Graham and Miller would belie any claim that the brutality of a
crime commonly “overpower[s]” the mitigating aspects of youth.69
Of course, this is not to say that juvenile LWOP sentences are never disproportionately harsh, but it suggests that any systemic tendencies to over-

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 2031.
Id. at 2032.
Id.
Id. (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005)).
Id.
See supra text accompanying note 53.
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harshness likely operate on the margins and are frequently offset by systemic
tendencies to lenience. Graham himself initially received a sentence of probation for a violent armed robbery attempt;70 the life sentence was not imposed until after Graham violated his probation and the case was transferred
to a different judge.71
In light of the uncertainty as to whether the likelihood of false positives
really is substantially greater than the likelihood of false negatives, the categorical rule of Graham likely arises, at least in part, from another consideration: whatever their relative frequency, false positives are simply a less acceptable type of error than false negatives – thus, courts should err in favor of
a lesser sentence than LWOP. Indeed, as if recognizing the difficulties with
relying on accuracy concerns alone, the Court offered another justification for
its categorical rule: such a rule “gives all juvenile nonhomicide offenders a
chance to demonstrate maturity and reform.”72 The significance of the word
“all” in this context is not entirely clear, but it seems best read to emphasize
the Court’s interest in giving even those juvenile offenders whose crimes really merit LWOP an opportunity to “demonstrate maturity and reform.”73 After
all, the word appears in response to the suggestion that judges should have the
freedom to impose LWOP in cases involving “particularly heinous crimes.”74
The Court is trying to give us a reason to prefer false negatives over false
positives; everyone should eventually be given a chance to demonstrate maturity and reform, even those who have committed “particularly heinous
crimes” involving the sort of aggravated culpability that may not really qualify as “twice diminished.”75
In determining why, the Court’s precise choice of words may again be
telling. The Court speaks of “demonstrat[ing] maturity and reform.”76
A “demonstration” implies a social act – there is an audience and a judgment
of the quality of the act. Thus, the Court does not contemplate that the reformed offender will enjoy his newfound maturity in isolation. Rather, maturity and reform are pathways to what Justice Anthony Kennedy, the author
of the majority opinion in Graham, elsewhere called “ordinary civic life in a
free society.”77
Graham seems to embrace a particular vision of human flourishing – a
vision that is essentially social and centered on the individual’s moral relationships with others. Consider, for instance, the Court’s explanation of why
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2018.
Id. at 2019-20.
Id. at 2032.
Id.
Id. at 2031.
Cf. id. at 2030 (finding that it is “not appropriate” for “the State [to]
make[] an irrevocable judgment about [a juvenile nonhomicide offender’s] value and
place in society”).
76. Id. at 2032.
77. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996).
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

File: O’Hear – Final Formatting 3/13/14

1104

Created on: 3/19/2014 8:58:00 AM

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

Last Printed: 3/19/2014 8:59:00 AM

[Vol. 78

LWOP raises the “same concerns” as the death penalty: “Life in prison without the possibility of parole gives no chance for fulfillment outside prison
walls, no chance for reconciliation with society, no hope.”78 The four-way
association is striking, with the Court linking death, hopelessness, physical
separation from society, and moral separation from society. A life of social
exclusion, the Court suggests, is hardly a life at all.79
While exclusion from society may be ordered, the period of exclusion
can and should be an occasion for the offender to make atonement for his
crimes, rather than merely a time to await release or death. The real evil of
LWOP is that the sentence eliminates incentives for atonement and precludes
the possibility of reconciliation with society:
Terrance Graham’s sentence guarantees that he will die in prison without any meaningful opportunity to obtain release, no
matter what he might do to demonstrate that the bad acts he
committed as a teenager are not representative of his true character, even if he spends the next half century attempting to
atone for his crimes and learn from his mistakes. The State has
denied him any chance to later demonstrate that he is fit to rejoin society based solely on a nonhomicide crime that he committed while he was a child in the eyes of the law. This the
Eighth Amendment does not permit.80
While the Court’s express focus here is on the moral status of the offender, the Court’s reasoning also seems implicitly premised on the moral
responsibility of society to respond to efforts made by the offender to achieve
atonement. In a moral-relational view of human flourishing, we must remain
open to the possibility of reconciliation with those who have wronged us;
otherwise, we stunt our own moral development and capacity for fulfillment.81 Fear and hatred can be prisons, too – Graham seems at some level an
effort to remind us of this great truth. Providing offenders with a realistic
path back to “ordinary civic life in a free society” may be as much for our
benefit as theirs.82 To be sure, the Court was hardly explicit about such moral
78. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2032.
79. Id. at 2032-33 (“Life in prison without the possibility of parole gives no

chance for fulfillment outside prison walls, no chance for reconciliation with society,
no hope.”).
80. Id. at 2033.
81. Cf. Michael M. O’Hear, Solving the Good-Time Puzzle: Why Following the
Rules Should Get You out of Prison Early, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 195, 220 (“[T]he offender who performs well in prison has indicated a desire and a capacity to reform . . .
We owe it to him and to ourselves to respond in some positive fashion . . . .”).
82. This line of thinking may profitably be connected to Professor Huigens’
insight that we constitute our collective character in important ways through our penal
practices. See discussion supra note 39; see also Huigens, supra note 34, at 120-21.
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foundations to its reasoning, but intuitions along these lines seem to underlie
Graham’s choice of a broad prophylactic remedy and help to illuminate the
Court’s particular concerns with LWOP as a sentence.

3. Preference for Individualized, Discretionary Sentencing
Miller’s basic holding – no mandatory LWOP even for juvenile killers –
seems puzzling in light of Graham’s proportionality analysis. After all, the
juvenile killer does not have Graham’s “twice diminished moral culpability.”83 Because juvenile status only once diminishes the culpability of
defendants like Miller, the second-most severe sentence (LWOP) should
be presumptively constitutional. It is not entirely clear why a categorical
safeguard such as the Miller rule is warranted for this set of cases. Rather
than overturning a mandatory sentencing law adopted by a majority of the
states, the Court might have instead relegated defendants like Miller to
case-by-case challenges to their sentences – an approach that would have
recognized the presumptively constitutional nature of LWOP for killers,
while preserving an opportunity for relief in unusual cases involving
additional culpability-diminution.
In embracing a categorical protection, the Court again invoked a concern about inaccuracy, as it had in Graham: “By making youth (and all that
accompanies it) irrelevant to imposition of that harshest prison sentence, [a
mandatory LWOP] scheme poses too great a risk of disproportionate punishment.”84 But, standing alone, this concern seems even less compelling as a
justification for a categorical rule than it was in Graham. After all, Graham
dealt with a presumptively disproportionate class of sentences, while Miller
seemingly dealt merely with “once diminished” punishment for “once diminished” culpability.
In short, it is difficult to account for Miller except by reference to a particular distrust of mandatory sentencing. After all, under Miller a type of
punishment – LWOP for juvenile killers – that is categorically acceptable if
imposed on a discretionary basis is now unconstitutional solely where it is
mandatory.85 It is not entirely clear why Miller adopted this double standard,
but the Court’s reasoning suggests at least three mutually supporting possibilities. First, the Miller rule may reflect deference considerations. For instance, in response to the states’ argument that the number of jurisdictions
employing mandatory juvenile LWOP precluded holding the practice unconstitutional, the Miller Court observed:
83. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2468 (2012) (quoting Graham, 130 S.
Ct. at 2027).
84. Id. at 2469.
85. More recently, the Court again indicated its distaste for mandatory
sentencing in Alleyne v. United States, in which the Court held that the facts triggering a minimum must be found by a jury instead of a judge. 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2158,
2163 (2013).
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[T]he cases here are different from the typical one in which we
have tallied legislative enactments. Our decision does not categorically bar a penalty for a class of offenders or type of crime .
. . . Instead, it mandates only that a sentencer follow a certain
process – considering an offender’s youth and attendant circumstances – before imposing a particular penalty.86
The Court thus seemed to treat its holding as less of an infringement on
the autonomy of state criminal justice systems than earlier Eight Amendment
decisions; after all, Miller did not rule out LWOP as a sentence for any class
of offense or class of offender but only spoke to the process by which the
sentence may be selected.87 In so doing, Miller actually augmented the power
of state trial court judges, even as it somewhat constricted the scope of legislative policy choice. Such a dynamic may lessen deference concerns that
would otherwise call for upholding a challenged sentence.
Second, the Court indicated that, as a mitigating factor, juvenile status in
particular may demand individualized assessment because it can affect culpability in several important but sometimes quite idiosyncratic ways. Indeed, in
its discussion of the significance of youth, the Miller Court not only reiterated
the key findings of Graham,88 it also highlighted an additional age-related
consideration: the fact that many juvenile offenders come from “chaotic and
abusive” households89 and “lack the ability to extricate themselves from horrific, crime-producing settings.”90 The Court observed of Miller himself,
“[I]f ever a pathological background might have contributed to a 14-yearold’s commission of a crime, it is here.”91 The Court concluded that “a sen-

86. Id. at 2471.
87. The Court’s underlying reasoning may echo that of Rita v. United States, in

which the Court held that federal appellate courts may accord a presumption of reasonableness to sentences imposed within the range recommended by the United States
Sentencing Guidelines. 551 U.S. 338, 340 (2007). In justifying this decision, the
Court observed:
[B]y the time an appeals court is considering a within-Guidelines sentence on
review, both the sentencing judge and the Sentencing Commission will have
reached the same conclusion as to the proper sentence in the particular case.
That double determination significantly increases the likelihood that the sentence is a reasonable one.

Id. at 347 (emphasis in original). Similarly, when there is a “double determination”
by both the legislature and the sentencing judge that an LWOP sentence is warranted
in a particular case, there is a greater likelihood that the sentence is reasonable (that is,
not disproportionate) than if there is only a single determination by the legislature. Id.
88. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464-65.
89. Id. at 2468.
90. Id. at 2464 (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005)).
91. Id. at 2469.
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tencer needed to examine all these circumstances before concluding that life
without any possibility of parole was the appropriate penalty.”92
Miller thus suggested that (1) juvenile status may sometimes function as
a sort of “super-mitigator” that diminishes culpability in some cases in more
than one way, and (2) that because this is a sufficiently common occurrence
in cases of juvenile homicide, mandatory LWOP creates an unacceptably
high risk of proportionality error.93 Read this way, Miller’s skepticism of
mandatory sentencing may be limited – at least in its strongest form – to cases
presenting mitigating circumstances that have an especially profound and
idiosyncratic character, such as juvenile status.
Finally, the Miller rule may be a further reflection of the Court’s special
concerns regarding LWOP and permanent social exclusion. Because LWOP
is so disfavored, the Court demands a double procedural safeguard: a legislature must authorize the penalty and a sentencing judge with discretion must
choose to impose it.94 Indeed, Miller arguably went beyond even Graham in
its treatment of LWOP as an extreme penalty. While Graham observed that
“life without parole sentences share some characteristics with death sentences,”95 it also reaffirmed that “a death sentence is unique in its severity and
irrevocability.”96 Miller, however, seemed to up the rhetorical ante in
analogizing LWOP to death, asserting that the Court now “view[s juvenile
LWOP] as akin to the death penalty.”97 Indeed, the “correspondence” between the two punishments was central to the Court’s ban on mandatory juvenile LWOP, for it made “relevant” the line of Eighth Amendment decisions
requiring individualized sentencing when the state seeks to impose its “harshest penalties.”98
To the extent that a heightened concern over the severity of the penalty
drove Miller’s rejection of mandatory sentencing, it is possible that the con-

92. Id.
93. See id. at 2467-68 (“Such mandatory penalties, by their nature, preclude a

sentencer from taking account of an offender’s age and the wealth of characteristics
and circumstances attendant to it. Under these schemes, every juvenile will receive
the same sentence as every other – the 17-year-old and the 14-year-old, the shooter
and the accomplice, the child from the stable household and the child from a chaotic
and abusive one.”). The sensibility here may reflect a view that, in at least some cases
of juvenile crime, society has failed in terribly profound ways in its responsibilities to
the child, and society must in some sense hold itself to account in these cases, even as
it holds the child to account; it would be hypocritical for society not to recognize in
some meaningful way its own contribution to the offense.
94. See id. at 2475.
95. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2027 (2010) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
96. Id.
97. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2466.
98. Id. at 2467-68.
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cern was limited to juvenile LWOP specifically rather than LWOP generally.
In Graham, the Court’s extended discussion of the severity of LWOP made
comparatively little mention of the specifics of juvenile status.99 Although
the Court noted – albeit almost in passing and near the end of the discussion –
that LWOP is “an especially harsh punishment for a juvenile” because “a
juvenile offender will on average serve more years and a greater percentage
of his life in prison than an adult offender,”100 the central point for purposes
of the Court’s holding was simply that “life without parole is the second most
severe penalty permitted by law.”101 In Miller, however, the Court more
prominently and starkly drew the difference between juvenile and adult
LWOP.102 Additionally, throughout its discussion of the severity of LWOP
the Court always included the word “juvenile” in its characterization of the
type of sentence at issue.103
Although it is possible that the peculiar nature of juvenile LWOP played
a crucial role in Miller’s rejection of mandatory sentencing, nothing in the
Court’s opinion casts doubt on the notion that LWOP generally should be
regarded as highly disfavored under Eighth Amendment analysis. Indeed,
such a stance would not be at all inconsistent with the view that juvenile
LWOP should be even more disfavored than adult LWOP.
Moreover, Miller offered an intriguing suggestion that may have an important bearing on the way courts should view the severity of adult LWOP:
Although adults are subject as well to the death penalty in many
jurisdictions, very few offenders actually receive that sentence.
So in practice, the sentencing schemes at issue here result in juvenile homicide offenders receiving the same nominal punishment as almost all adults, even though the two classes differ
significantly in moral culpability and capacity for change.104
The Court thus indicated that the dramatic, long-term decline in the frequency of the imposition and execution of death sentences in the United
99. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2027-28.
100. Id. at 2028.
101. Id. at 2027 (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991)) (in-

ternal quotation marks omitted).
102. Compare id. at 2028 (“[A] juvenile offender will on average serve more
years and a greater percentage of his life in prison than an adult offender.” (emphasis
added)), with Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2466 (“[A juvenile] will almost inevitably serve
‘more years and a greater percentage of his life in prison than an adult offender.’”
(emphasis added) quoting Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028)).
103. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2466-67. Elsewhere in this Symposium, however, William Berry argues persuasively that “the distinction between a juvenile LWOP sentence and a life-without-parole sentence is not of great significance.” William W.
Berry III, Eighth Amendment Differentness, 78 MO. L. REV. 1053, 1084 (2013).
104. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468 n.7 (citation omitted).
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States since the 1990s105 has relevance for the constitutionality of less severe
sentences. As a result, we may soon need to start regarding LWOP not as the
second-most severe penalty in our punishment system, but as the de facto
most severe penalty – a perspective that has important implications for the
sort of categorical-proportionality analysis embraced by Graham.

C. Synthesis
Graham and Miller’s prophylactic rules seem premised on the belief that
juvenile offenders normally have diminished culpability relative to adult offenders and should therefore receive lesser punishments for the same crimes.
Yet this principle, standing alone, does not seem to fully capture the sensibilities that animate the opinions. First, the opinions attend to deference considerations; it is not clear, for instance, that the cases would come out as they did
without the Court’s findings of legislative inadvertence. Additionally, the
prophylactic rules are hard to account for in the absence of particular reservations about LWOP and mandatory sentencing.
Given their uncertainties and equivocations, it is foolhardy to claim that
Graham and Miller establish anything as formal and definite as a new “test”
for Eighth Amendment claims. But one may discern in the two opinions the
outlines of a multifaceted heuristic of sorts. Here, it seems, are the key features of the Court’s approach.
First, the core of the Eighth Amendment analysis is the culpabilitybased, categorical proportionality review; in this review, the Court considers
how far removed the offense is from the most serious offense (adult homicide), and how far removed the sentence is from the harshest punishment (the
death penalty). If the sentence is categorically more severe than the offense,
the sentence is at least presumptively unconstitutional, subject to the possibility that utilitarian crime-control benefits are sufficiently compelling as to
outweigh the mismatch between culpability and punishment.
Second, this proportionality review is conditioned by various deferencerelated factors, including the frequency of the challenged sentence in practice,
extent of deliberate legislative choice in favor of the sentence, and consistency of the sentence with international legal norms; the more convincingly
these factors support deference, the less likely the Court will find that a sentence fails proportionality review. When, however, the case for deference is
not particularly strong, the Court may conduct a more rigorous review analogous to the heightened scrutiny sometimes performed in other areas of constitutional law.106
Third, proportionality review is also conditioned by a preference for the
eventual social reintegration of all offenders; the Court will thus err against
105. See Michael M. O’Hear, The Beginning of the End for Life Without Parole?,
FED. SENT’G REP., Oct. 2010, at 4 (discussing death penalty data).
106. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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affirming an LWOP sentence, as it does the death penalty.107 For instance,
the Court is more inclined to adopt a categorical prophylactic rule rather than
leave proportionality concerns to case-by-case review.108
Finally, the Court also disfavors mandatory sentencing and may
overturn a mandatory LWOP regime even in the absence of a clear, categorical mismatch between culpability and punishment (although this may be
limited to situations involving certain sorts of super-mitigators or cases of
juvenile LWOP).

III. MAKING SENSE OF HARMELIN AND EWING
This Part considers whether the understanding of Graham and Miller
sketched above can be reconciled with Ewing and Harmelin.

A. Ewing v. California
In Ewing, the Court upheld the application of the California “Three
Strikes and You’re Out” law to a repeat offender who received a sentence
of twenty-five years to life for shoplifting.109 At first blush, upholding such
a harsh sentence for such a minor offense seems hard to square with
Graham’s robust proportionality review.110 Graham’s own proffered distinction is hardly satisfying:
The approach in cases such as Harmelin and Ewing is suited for
considering a gross proportionality challenge to a particular defendant’s sentence, but here a sentencing practice itself is in
question. This case implicates a particular type of sentence as it
applies to an entire class of offenders who have committed a
range of crimes.111

107. See Rachel E. Barkow, Categorizing Graham, FED. SENT’G REP., Oct. 2010,
at 49 (discussing the Court’s “death is different” jurisprudence, which has imposed
various limitations on capital punishment based on the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause).
108. William Berry has a made a similar argument. See William W. Berry III,
More Different than Life, Less Different than Death, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 1109, 1113
(2010) (arguing “that ‘life without parole’ merits its own category of heightened review in the application of the Eighth Amendment, requiring perhaps fewer categorical
limitations than the death penalty but certainly greater protections” than in the preGraham cases).
109. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003).
110. Ewing did not present, and the Court did not consider, a Miller-type
procedural challenge to his sentence, so there seems no need to try to reconcile Ewing
with Miller.
111. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2022-23 (2010).
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The Court’s lack of citation to precedent in this passage is telling, for the
distinction between a challenge to a particular sentence and a challenge to a
sentencing practice has no grounding in the Court’s earlier Eighth Amendment jurisprudence on noncapital sentences. There is, moreover, a good reason why the Court had not previously made such a distinction: any challenge
to a particular sentence can easily be reframed as a challenge to a sentencing
practice, and there is no obvious basis for limiting such reframing. For instance, Ewing could have couched his attack on the California three-strikes
law as a challenge to a “particular type of sentence” (twenty-five years to life)
“as it applies to an entire class of offenders who have committed a range of
crimes” (from shoplifting to major violent offenses).112 Indeed, the Ewing
plurality itself framed the question it confronted in sentencing-practice terms
rather than particular-sentence terms, stating, “In this case we decide whether
the Eighth Amendment prohibits the State of California from sentencing a
repeat felon to a prison term of 25 years to life under the State’s ‘Three
Strikes and You’re Out’ law.”113
Nor does it seem very satisfying to distinguish the cases merely on the
basis that one involved a juvenile defendant and the other an adult. Recall
that Graham’s sentence was unconstitutional because his case presented
“twice diminished moral culpability”: once diminished for his juvenile status,
and once again because he did not kill nor intend to kill.114 The proportionality analysis of Graham thus requires analysis not only of the characteristics
of the offender, but also of the nature of the offense. There seems no good
reason under Graham why the defendant who commits an extremely minor
crime – like shoplifting – should not be regarded as having moral culpability
that is also twice diminished. A more persuasive basis for reconciling Ewing
with Graham is provided by the multifaceted analysis described in Part II
above, particularly by reference to the deference considerations and the
Court’s aversion to LWOP and permanent social exclusion.

1. Conditioning Considerations
The three deference considerations paramount in Graham were: (1) the
infrequency of juvenile LWOP sentences for nonhomicide offenses, (2) legislative inadvertence, and (3) the nearly universal international condemnation
of juvenile LWOP.115 However, in Ewing the defendant did not urge any of
these considerations and none of the considerations figured into the plurality’s analysis. As to infrequency, the defendant’s brief noted in passing that
only 1,346 defendants were sentenced under California’s three-strikes law for

112.
113.
114.
115.

See id.
Ewing, 538 U.S. at 14.
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2027.
See supra Part II.B.
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minor property offenses,116 but nothing was made of this point and nothing in
the Ewing Court’s various opinions indicates that any of the Justices focused
on it. Moreover, the 1,346 figure in Ewing is much higher than the 123 defendants affected by Graham,117 which may itself supply a significant ground
for distinguishing the cases.118
Ewing made no claim of inadvertence at all, and the plurality found
quite the opposite. For instance, the plurality characterized the three-strikes
law as “respon[sive] to widespread public concerns about crime,”119 and noted that the California legislature “made a deliberate policy decision . . . that
the gravity of the new felony should not be a determinative factor in trigger116. Brief for Petitioner, Ewing, 538 U.S. 11 (No. 01-6978), 2002 WL 1769930,
at *16 (“[Three-strikers] were sentenced to twenty-five years to life for property
crimes, including grand theft (108), petty theft with a prior (334), vehicle theft (217),
receiving stolen property (164), forgery (58), and second degree burglary
(455) . . . .”).
117. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2024.
118. Indeed, the gap between Ewing and Graham in this regard is likely even
more than simply 1,346 versus 123. For one thing, the Ewing number came from
only one state, while the Graham number was national. Although the Ewing Court
did not have before it much data on sentences actually imposed in other states, it is
possible that the 1,346 figure would increase if such data were available. See Ewing,
538 U.S. at 45-46 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“With three exceptions, we do not have
before us information about actual time served by Ewing-type offenders in other
States. . . . In nine . . . States, the law might make it legally possible to impose a sentence of 25 years or more, though that fact by itself, of course, does not mean that
judges have actually done so.” (citations omitted)). Additionally, as Graham indicated, the number of defendants receiving a challenged sentence should be considered
relative to the number of offenders who commit a relevant crime. Graham, 130 S. Ct.
at 2024-25. The number of juveniles who are arrested for serious violent crimes each
year surely dwarfs the number of two-strikers arrested for minor property offenses,
which makes the 1,346 figure seem comparatively even more impressive as an indicator of relatively high frequency. See id. at 2025 (noting tens of thousands of annual
arrests of juveniles for aggravated assault, robbery, and other serious offenses);
FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING ET AL., PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY: THREE STRIKES AND
YOU’RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA 44, 49 (2001) (noting that about twenty-five percent of
felony arrests in California in 1993 were attributable to juveniles, while only 4.3 percent of arrestees in a sample of felony arrests that year had two strikes; of that small
percentage of total felony arrestees, only 15.5 percent were arrested for non-burglary
thefts). To be sure, this may seem an unfair comparison because the three-strikes
sentence in Ewing was nominally mandatory, while the juvenile LWOP sentences in
Graham were discretionary. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2471 n.10
(2012) (rejecting relevance of frequency of a mandatorily imposed sentence). However, the California three-strikes sentence was only nominally a mandatory one.
Ewing, 538 U.S. at 17 (“Thus, [California] trial courts may avoid imposing a three
strikes sentence in two ways: first, by reducing ‘wobblers’ to misdemeanors (which
do not qualify as triggering offenses), and second, by vacating allegations of prior
‘serious’ or ‘violent’ felony convictions.”).
119. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 24.
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ing the application of the Three Strikes Law.”120 This stands in marked contrast to the Graham Court’s finding that juvenile LWOP had not been adopted
“through deliberate, express, and full legislative consideration.”121
Finally, Ewing raised international views only in a footnote and, even
then, made only a weak showing of international condemnation, citing legal
standards in just two foreign jurisdictions.122 This falls far short of Graham’s
finding that juvenile LWOP for nonhomicide offenses was a “sentencing
practice rejected the world over,”123 a punishment imposed in only one nation
across the entire globe (the United States), and a practice formally condemned in an international treaty “ratified by every nation except the United
States and Somalia.”124
To be sure, there is at least one sense in which Graham’s Eighth
Amendment claim was actually more of a threat to deference ideals
than Ewing’s: a judgment in Graham’s favor would effectively overturn
the law in thirty-nine jurisdictions,125 whereas only twenty-five jurisdictions
had three-strikes laws126 and an even smaller number of states would have
authorized the sentence imposed on Ewing.127 Graham and Miller make
clear, however, that legislative “nose counting” need not be a weighty
consideration, particularly where there is evidence of legislative inadvertence.128 Taking into account the full set of criteria that bear on the question,
there seems ample ground for distinguishing Ewing from Graham on the deference considerations.
Lastly, one must take into account a final conditioning consideration:
LWOP-aversion. (Mandatoriness-aversion does not come into play because
the sentencing judge did have discretion in Ewing’s case.129) While the California three-strikes sentence is certainly a long one, it does not embody the
kind of permanent exclusion that Graham’s did, nor does it evoke the same
sense of hopelessness.130 This too provides a seemingly important basis for
explaining the Court’s different approaches in Graham and Ewing.
120. Id. at 30 n.2 (alteration in original) (quoting James A. Ardaiz, Essay, California’s Three Strikes Law: History, Expectations, Consequences, 32 MCGEORGE L.
REV. 1, 9 (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
121. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026.
122. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 116, at *38 n.32.
123. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2033.
124. Id. at 2034.
125. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2471 (2012).
126. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 15 (2003).
127. See id. at 46 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“In nine . . . States, the law might
make it legally possible to impose a sentence of 25 years or more . . . .” (emphasis
in original)).
128. See supra Part II.B.1.b.
129. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 17.
130. To be sure, the dissenters in Ewing did assert that Ewing “will likely die in
prison,” id. at 39 (Breyer, J., dissenting), but it is not clear what the basis for this
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2. Categorical-Proportionality Review
One may get a better sense of the importance of the deference factors by
considering whether Ewing is distinguishable from Graham on the basis of
categorical-proportionality review alone. This seems quite difficult; after all,
if Graham’s offense was once-diminished because it did not involve death or
an intent to cause death, surely Ewing’s was at least twice-diminished to the
extent that it did not involve any physical injury of any kind, either caused or
intended. If one imagines a category comprised of the 1,346 “three-strikers”
convicted of low-level property offenses, there is a very strong argument that
an LWOP sentence could not be imposed on them consistent with the categorical-proportionality reasoning of Graham.
Yet, it may nonetheless be possible to reconcile Ewing and Graham with
respect to proportionality. For one thing, Ewing did not receive an LWOP
sentence; rather, he received a sentence of twenty-five years to life.131 This is
not “the second most severe penalty permitted by law,” as Graham characterized LWOP132 – it may not even be thought of as the third most severe penalty (it is possible, for instance, to imagine a parole-eligible life sentence with a
materially longer minimum term than twenty-five years).
Also important may be the criminal history that is necessary to trigger a
three-strikes sentence. Conventional theories of retributive proportionality
recognize that it may be appropriate to treat repeat offending as more morally
blameworthy than first-time offending:
The first offender who is given a somewhat scaled-down punishment is censured for his act but nevertheless accorded some
moral respect for the fact that his inhibitions against wrongdoing appear to have functioned on prior occasions, and some
sympathy or tolerance for the all-too-human frailty that can lead
to such a lapse.133
Although this perspective on proportionality may justify different degrees of punishment for low-level property offenders depending on whether
they have a prior record, it remains unclear whether that prior record alone
can bring a three-strikes sentence like Ewing’s within the range of minimally
acceptable proportionality for a crime like shoplifting. For one thing, criminal history is conceptualized here in terms of mitigation, not aggravation; that
is, we have a justification for a first-timer discount, not a repeat-offender
assertion was (beyond a vague reference to illness), and the plurality opinion did not
characterize Ewing’s sentence in those terms.
131. Id. at 14.
132. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2027 (2012) (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
133. Andrew von Hirsch, Penal Theories, in THE HANDBOOK OF CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT 659, 670 (Michael Tonry ed., 1998).
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enhancement. However, this may be a distinction without a difference in the
ordinal culpability analysis suggested by Graham. It is possible that the offense-based categorical distinctions – for instance, homicide versus nonhomicide – may assume a first-time offender and recidivism may be thought of as,
in some sense, canceling out one unit of culpability-diminution.
Significant difficulties nonetheless remain for the proportionality of
Ewing’s sentence. Not all prior offenses seem capable of contributing to the
blameworthiness of a new offense. For instance, the further removed the
priors are in time and nature from the current offense, the less material they
seem to the severity of the current offense.134 Thus, Ewing’s prior “strikes” –
three burglaries and a robbery occurring more than eight years before the
shoplifting incident135 – might be seen as insufficiently recent or insufficiently similar to the shoplifting to justify a materially harsher sentence than he
would have received as a first-time offender.
Finally, even if some incremental punishment was justified based on
Ewing’s criminal history, there may be limits as to how much. The loss-ofmitigation theory does not justify continually harsher punishment on the basis
of each new offense; at some point fairly early in the process – perhaps at the
second or third offense (assuming they are all sufficiently close in time and
character) – all available mitigation is lost and additional convictions no
longer enhance culpability.136 It is certainly possible to see shoplifting as so
categorically removed from a twenty-five-to-life sentence that mere loss of
mitigation cannot possibly cover the severity gap.137
134. See, e.g., R.A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY 167
(2001) (“The fact, for instance, that someone now convicted of theft was convicted of
wounding five years ago provides no good reason to impose a harsher punishment for
the theft, since it provides no good reason to judge either the current offense or the
offender more harshly.”).
135. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 18-19.
136. DUFF, supra note 134, at 169.
137. The loss-of-mitigation theory has been the leading proposal for reconciling
harsher sentences for recidivists with retributive ideals. However, Julian Roberts has
recently offered an alternative approach, the enhanced culpability model. JULIAN V.
ROBERTS, PUNISHING PERSISTENT OFFENDERS: EXPLORING COMMUNITY AND
OFFENDER PERSPECTIVES 67 (2008). Based on research on public and offender attitudes, Roberts argues that “a retributive account which wholly, or almost completely,
ignores previous convictions violates fundamental, consensual reactions to punishing
offenders.” Id. at xi. He asserts, “Previous convictions speak to the offender’s state
of mind prior to the commission of the offence in the same way that premeditation
reflects an individual more worthy of censure . . . .” Id. at 67. Although Roberts
would give greater weight to prior convictions than would the loss-of-mitigation theory (especially past the first conviction or two, when mitigation runs out), it seems
highly unlikely that Roberts’ approach would provide support for Ewing’s sentence.
For one thing, Roberts insists that prior convictions must be given less weight than
other considerations that speak more directly to the seriousness of the current offense:
“The[] offender-related factors [like previous convictions] must be subordinate to the
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Yet loss of mitigation may not be the only theory on which criminal history is relevant to proportionality. Professor R.A. Duff, for instance, posits
the existence of a class of highly dangerous recidivists who deserve very
harsh treatment:
By his persistent, serious criminal wrongdoing [an offender in
this class] has made reconciliation – the maintenance or restoration of civic fellowship – impossible. He has disqualified himself from continued participation in the community’s normal
life. We can thus justly subject him to an extended, indeed if
necessary life-long, period of imprisonment, both to protect
others from his continuing depredations and as a proportionate

offense factors within a retributive framework in which offence seriousness predominates. Allowing offender variables to carry the same or more weight at sentencing
would shift the focus of sentencing away from the offence to the offender.” Id. at 89.
Additionally, while Roberts would allow prior convictions to continue to increase
sentence length even after mitigation has been lost, he would not give as much weight
to later convictions as to the first ones. See id. (“[T]he difference in culpability between a first offender and an individual with two priors is much greater than that
which differentiates an offender with two from another with four priors.”). Additionally, Roberts would not treat all prior convictions the same, but would make distinctions, for instance, based on how old the priors are and whether they were of the same
character as the current offense. Id. at 224. Finally, Roberts believes that “recidivists
should be allowed to credit efforts to desist against the elevated culpability ascribed to
them at sentencing.” Id. at 209. Thus, Roberts disagrees with mechanical approaches
to handling criminal history, such as that embodied in the three strikes law. See id. at
89 (“[T]he recidivist sentencing premium cannot be reduced to the progressive ascription of a quantum of punishment for each prior; consideration of the offender’s previous convictions requires a more multidimensional approach . . . .”).
Youngjae Lee has also recently proposed a sort of enhanced culpability model for the “recidivism premium.” Youngjae Lee, Recidivism as Omission: A Relational Account, 87 TEX. L. REV. 571, 571 (2009). Lee sees the premium as an additional punishment for a type of omission liability, “the omission being [the recidivist’s] failure to take steps to prevent himself from committing another crime.” Id. at
610. Of course, even a first-time offender could be faulted for this sort of omission.
What distinguishes the recidivist and merits greater blame is that a first conviction
“should prompt a period of reflection on the part of offenders to determine how they
ended up committing the prohibited act.” Id. at 613. However, there is at least one
major practical problem with Lee’s approach: at the same time that a conviction sends
a message that the offender should “organize her life in a way that steers clear of
criminality,” id., the conviction also constricts, sometimes quite dramatically, the
scope of life choices available to an offender, making a reflective and constructive
self-reorganization of the offender’s life much more difficult, if not a near impossibility. Lee recognizes this problem, but does not offer a clear solution. Id. at 618-20. In
any event, Lee’s account, like that of Roberts, does not purport to justify a large recidivist premium, but rather “places a ceiling on it.” Id. at 618. Indeed, Lee specifically
identifies the California three-strikes law as one that “go[es] too far.” Id. at 578.
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punishment for his crime. What makes it proportionate, although it is very much more severe than the punishments imposed on other, nonpersistent offenders who committed crimes
similar to his latest crime, is that his crime, as part of a pattern
of persistent serious criminality, is categorically more serious
than theirs. In the context of that pattern, it is no longer a single, isolated attack on others but a further stage in a continuing
attack, a continuing campaign of attacks, on the community’s
members and its central values.138
While there may be some offenders sentenced under California’s threestrikes law who could conceivably be placed into this category, it seems
doubtful that Ewing himself could, for Professor Duff’s theory presupposes
“persistent commission of crimes of serious violence against the person.”139
Ewing’s crimes were, for the most part, offenses directed at property and not
the person, which hardly seems a “campaign of attacks”140 on society’s central values (at least as Professor Duff understands those values to be).
Perhaps criminal history can do more work in the proportionality analysis if it is linked to a character-based theory of culpability. As discussed
above, Graham contains language suggesting that character may play an important role in the culpability calculus. However, the Court provides no clear
sense of how this works outside the context of juveniles and perhaps others
whose characters are similarly unsettled, such as the mentally ill.
Indeed, what the Court has in mind for character-assessment may
not differ much from the loss-of-mitigation theory.141 While one may initially feel a sense of “sympathy or tolerance” for all-too-familiar frailties,142 this
does not imply progressively greater punishments as our sympathy runs out
and is replaced by swelling indignation over a recidivist’s failure to get
his character in order. There is nothing in Graham that is inconsistent with
this limited, dichotomous view of character’s relevance; that is, culpability
either is or is not once diminished based on whether the instant offense seems
the sort of isolated, otherwise explicable lapse with which all of us can

138. DUFF, supra note 134, at 172 (emphases in original). It should be noted that,
despite articulating this argument, Duff himself hardly embraces it, but instead confesses that its harshness leaves him feeling “uneasy.” Id. at 172-73.
139. Id. at 170.
140. See id. at 172 (emphasis omitted).
141. Cf. Allan Manson, The Search for Principles of Mitigation: Integrating Cultural Demands, in MITIGATION AND AGGRAVATION AT SENTENCING 40, 57 (Julian V.
Roberts ed., 2011) (“Outside optimism and the ‘out of character’ assumption that we
tend to apply to first offenders, there can be little room for mitigation based on character. This is antagonistic both to proportionality and to equality of treatment.” (emphasis added)).
142. von Hirsch, supra note 133, at 670.
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and should be able to identify.143 Among other advantages, this approach saves proportionality analysis from the considerable practical and
theoretical difficulties of engaging in a more open-ended assessment of
the offender’s character.144
In the end, there remains enough uncertainty in the categoricalproportionality analysis that one cannot rule out the possibility that Ewing’s
sentence might pass muster. Still, in light of the great disparity between Graham’s violent, armed burglary and Ewing’s attempt at shoplifting, the argument hardly seems compelling that categorical-proportionality considerations
alone can distinguish the results in the two cases.145 These proportionality
143. Indeed, it may be best to read all of the discussion in Graham of the significance juvenile status for character as really simply establishing that all juveniles qualify per se for a “first-timer” discount, that is, recidivism may not be used against a
juvenile in the Eighth Amendment analysis as a justification for a harsher sentence
than would otherwise be permissible. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
Consistent with this view, the Graham Court gave no apparent weight to the fact that
Graham himself was a recidivist or any apparent consideration to the possibility of
carving out repeat-offenders from its prophylactic rule. See id.
144. See, e.g., DUFF, supra note 134, at 168 (arguing against uses of criminal
history at sentencing that would “involve an improper intrusion into [the offender’s]
general moral character . . . .”); Andrew Ashworth, Re-evaluating the Justifications
for Aggravation and Mitigation at Sentencing, in MITIGATION AND AGGRAVATION AT
SENTENCING, supra note 141, at 29 (“The question is whether the sentencing process
is properly expected to incorporate a balance sheet of all the good and bad deeds of
the offender in social, family, and community circles. The principled answer is that it
should not be so expected: a court should take account of previous convictions or
absence of convictions, and of aggravating and mitigating factors relevant to harm
and culpability, but it is neither appropriate nor always possible for it to attempt this
wider exercise in social accounting.”); Huigens, supra note 34, at 109 (“We might
commit the question of fault to the jury in the form of a free-ranging inquiry into the
quality of the defendant's practical reasoning, as exhibited in his wrongdoing. If we
did this, however, we would raise some difficulties that are unrelated to the nature of
fault, but that impose some important limits on how fault is to be adjudicated. These
difficulties fall under the heading of the principle of legality.”).
145. In this proportionality analysis, I’ve emphasized a culpability-based approach. However, the Ewing plurality itself invoked more instrumental considerations in rejecting the claim that Ewing’s sentence was unconstitutionally disproportionate. See Ewing v. Cal., 538 U.S. 11, 30 (2003) (“[Ewing’s sentence] reflects a
rational legislative judgment, entitled to deference, that offenders who have committed serious or violent felonies and who continue to commit felonies must be incapacitated. . . . Ewing’s is not the rare cases in which a threshold comparison of the crime
committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Graham accepted that
incapacitation might play a role in the proportionality analysis, see 130 S. Ct. at 2029
(characterizing incapacitation as a “legitimate reason for imprisonment”), but also
expressed concern that “[i]ncapacitation cannot override all other considerations lest
the Eighth Amendment’s rule against disproportionate sentences be a nullity.” Id.
Indeed, the Court recognized that Graham should be incapacitated for a period of
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difficulties underscore the importance of the conditioning considerations.
Comparing the plurality opinion in Ewing with the opinion in Graham, it is
hard to avoid the impression that the former employed a sort of rational basis
review, while the latter – whether due to the influence of infrequency, legislative inadvertence, international condemnation, LWOP-avoidance, or some
combination of the four – engaged in a more rigorous form of scrutiny.

B. Harmelin v. Michigan
Because it involved an LWOP sentence and because that sentence was
mandated by statute, Harmelin seems factually closer to Graham – and even
more so to Miller – than Ewing was and is therefore more difficult to reconcile with the recent decisions. This Section first considers how Harmelin
relates to Graham, and then attempt to reconcile Harmelin with Miller.

1. Reconciling Harmelin with Graham
As to conditioning considerations, legislative deliberateness may best
distinguish Graham from Harmelin. In contrast to the Graham Court’s concerns regarding inadvertence, Justice Kennedy’s controlling opinion in Harmelin emphasized the high quality of the Michigan legislature’s work in
adopting the “650 lifer law,” which mandated LWOP for possession of more
than 650 grams of cocaine.146 Justice Kennedy elaborated, “This system is
not an ancient one revived in a sudden or surprising way; it is, rather, a recent
enactment calibrated with care, clarity, and much deliberation to address a
most serious contemporary problem.”147 Additionally, and also in contrast
with Graham, the Harmelin Court did not note and the defendant did not urge
any inconsistency between the 650 lifer law and international legal norms.148
time, see id. (“Graham deserved to be separated from society for some time in order
to prevent what the trial court described as an ‘escalating pattern of criminal conduct.’” (citation omitted)), but simply saw the extent of the incapacitation as unjustified. Id. Yet, it is hard to see how Ewing’s long-term incapacitation was more justified than Graham’s, especially in light of the nonviolent nature of his offense; the
general difficulties with predicting dangerousness accurately several years down the
road even with the most carefully constructed models is shown in Paul H. Robinson &
John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 464-66 (1997). Additionally, the over-inclusiveness of the California three-strikes law is well-documented
in ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 118, at 58-61.
146. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1007-08 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
147. Id.
148. See Brief of Petitioner, Harmelin, 501 U.S. 957 (No. 89-7272), 1990 WL
515104. In other respects, though, deference considerations do not so clearly differentiate Graham from Harmelin. For instance, the numbers of offenders receiving the
sentences at issue may not have differed much. As of 2009, eighteen years after
Harmelin, the number of offenders sentenced under the 650 lifer law was still only
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It is not surprising, then, that the controlling opinion in Harmelin emphasized
deference as a central value in its analysis149 and expressly used the language
of rational-basis review.150
Harmelin is also distinguishable from Graham in the categoricalproportionality analysis. Although both cases involved nonhomicide crimes
and presented “once diminished” culpability on that basis, Harmelin did not
offer as clear a ground as Graham for further diminution. Harmelin had no
prior felony convictions,151 but this does not necessarily count as mitigating;
as suggested in the analysis of Ewing above,152 it may make more sense to
think of a first offense as the baseline condition in the culpability analysis and
criminal history as aggravating.
There is another possibility: perhaps Harmelin’s crime was so minor that
the culpability must be considered more than just once diminished. After all,
his drug offense was not merely a nonhomicide crime, it was also seemingly
nonviolent; we have no reason to think that Harmelin caused or intended to
cause any sort of physical injury to any person in connection with his drugdealing. However, the controlling opinion in Harmelin was expressly premised on the belief that the possession of 650 grams of cocaine could in some
meaningful sense be characterized as violent:
Petitioner was convicted of possession of more than 650 grams
(over 1.5 pounds) of cocaine. This amount of pure cocaine has
a potential yield of between 32,500 and 65,000 doses. From
any standpoint, this crime falls in a different category from the
relatively minor, nonviolent crime at issue in Solem [v. Helm].
Possession, use, and distribution of illegal drugs represent one
of the greatest problems affecting the health and welfare of our
about 200. Rethinking the “Lifer Law,” CBS NEWS (Feb. 11, 2009, 10:14 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-500164_162-49670.html. Nor is it likely that many
offenders like Harmelin were serving LWOP sentences in other states at the time;
only Alabama then made LWOP available as a sentence for a first-time drug offender,
and even then only for quantities much higher than Michigan’s 650-gram threshold.
Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1026 (White, J., dissenting). As for legislative support in other
jurisdictions, only one other state besides Michigan authorized LWOP for first-time
drug offenders, id. at 1026 (White, J., dissenting), which stands in marked contrast to
the majority of states authorizing LWOP in the circumstances at issue in Graham.
See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2023 (“Thirty-seven States as well as the District of Columbia permit sentences of life without parole for a juvenile nonhomicide offender in
some circumstances.”).
149. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 998-1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring and concurring in
the judgment).
150. Id. at 1004 (Kennedy, J., concurring and concurring in the judgment) (“Similarly, a rational basis exists for Michigan to conclude that petitioner’s crime is as
serious and violent as the crime of felony murder without specific intent to kill . . . .”).
151. Id. at 994.
152. See supra Part III.A.2.
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population. Petitioner’s suggestion that his crime was nonviolent and victimless, echoed by the dissent, is false to the point
of absurdity. . . .
[T]he Michigan Legislature could with reason conclude that the
threat posed to the individual and society by possession of this
large an amount of cocaine – in terms of violence, crime, and
social displacement – is momentous enough to warrant the deterrence and retribution of a life sentence without parole. . . .
[A] rational basis exists for Michigan to conclude that petitioner’s crime is as serious and violent as the crime of felony murder without specific intent to kill, a crime for which no sentence
of imprisonment would be disproportionate.153
Given this premise – that possession of more than 650 grams of cocaine
is analogous to felony murder for culpability purposes – and the absence of
juvenile status or any other categorical basis for diminishing culpability,
Harmelin’s sentence is not inconsistent with the logic of Graham.

2. Reconciling Harmelin with Miller
Harmelin involved not merely an LWOP sentence, but a mandatory
LWOP sentence. Moreover, Harmelin – unlike Ewing – presented not only a
substantive, Graham-type challenge to his sentence, but also a procedural,
Miller-type claim. The affirmance of Harmelin’s sentence thus seems to be
in real tension with Miller’s rejection of a mandatory LWOP regime.
Despite this tension, there are at least four plausible (and not mutually
exclusive) possibilities for reconciling the cases. First, the “care, clarity, and
much deliberation” underlying the 650 lifer law contrasts with the legislative
inadvertence found by the Court in Miller and seemingly demands a higher
level of deference. Second, there is the “super-mitigator” theory suggested
above154: juvenile status may trigger special concerns regarding mandatory
sentencing that were not present in Harmelin. Third, also suggested above,
the Miller Court may intend to distinguish juvenile LWOP as a more severe
and disfavored penalty than LWOP generally.155
Finally, there is the intriguing suggestion in Miller that the declining use
of the death penalty has altered the way LWOP should be viewed for Eighth
Amendment purposes.156 Miller noted that, even among adults convicted of
homicide, “very few offenders actually receive” the death penalty, which
153. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1002-04 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
154. See supra Part II.B.3.
155. See supra Part II.B.3.
156. See supra Part II.B.3.
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results in “juvenile homicide offenders receiving the same nominal punishment as almost all adults, even though the two classes differ significantly in
moral culpability and capacity for change.”157
However, the American death penalty was in a considerably more robust
state in 1991 when Harmelin was decided, which meant that LWOP could
more appropriately be characterized as the second-most severe penalty in the
American criminal-justice system.158 Today, with LWOP looking increasingly like our most severe penalty, Harmelin would present an analogous culpability-mismatch problem to that highlighted by the Miller Court: since LWOP
has become de facto the harshest penalty imposed in homicide cases, the critical homicide-nonhomicide distinction is blurred when LWOP is permitted in
nonhomicide cases as well. In other words, Harmelin may have been correctly decided in light of circumstances as they existed in 1991, but Miller was
also correctly decided in light of the changed circumstances regarding the
death penalty that existed two decades later.

IV. APPLICATION TO 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)
Thus far, I have suggested a more nuanced way of reconciling the
Eighth Amendment cases than through a rigid juvenile-adult distinction. My
account of the cases provides room, at least in theory, for adults to challenge
their LWOP sentences, either on substantive, Graham-type grounds or on
procedural, Miller-type grounds. However, my account does not suggest that
adult LWOP sentences will always or even usually be unconstitutional. Rather, the analysis turns on the particularities of the claim.
In order to elucidate both the potential and the pitfalls of efforts to
extend Graham and Miller to adults, this Part assesses the prospects for
Eighth Amendment challenges to one mandatory LWOP regime established
for certain drug offenders by 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). The analysis first
describes the statutory regime and identifies a class of offenders who might
plausibly raise an Eighth Amendment challenge to the regime. Next, the
analysis separately considers the prospects for a Graham-type challenge and a
Miller-type challenge.159
157. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2468 n.7 (2012).
158. See TRACY L. SNELL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 2010 –

STATISTICAL TABLES 18 tbl.14 (2011), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/pdf/cp10st.pdf (showing 268 death sentences imposed in 1991, as compared to
only 104 in 2010; the number has steadily declined for more than a decade, and has
been well below 268 every year since 1999).
159. I assume for purposes of this Part that federal courts should apply the same
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause analysis to federal sentences that the Supreme
Court has developed in Graham and Miller for the review of state sentences. However, Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer has recently offered an interesting, historically
based argument that the Eighth Amendment should be interpreted differently when
federal sentences are under review, specifically, through a requirement that “federal
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A. Framing the Hypothetical Eighth Amendment Claims
Section 841(b)(1)(A) appears within a graduated sentencing scheme for
drug-trafficking offenses.160 Quantity is a key consideration in this scheme,
sentences be no stricter than state sentences for the same crime.” Michael J. Zydney
Mannheimer, Cruel and Unusual Federal Punishments, 98 IOWA L. REV. 69, 74
(2012). As indicated in the Appendix to the present Article, few states authorize
LWOP for drug offenses, which suggests that section 841(b)(1)(A) sentences might
be subject to even stronger challenges under Mannheimer’s approach than my own.
160. The statute’s text is as follows:
(b) Penalties
. . . any person who violates subsection (a) of this section [prohibiting the
manufacture of and trafficking in controlled substances] shall be sentenced as
follows:
(1)(A) In the case of a violation of subsection (a) of this section involving –
(i) 1 kilogram or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable
amount of heroin;
(ii) 5 kilograms or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable
amount of –
(I) coca leaves, except coca leaves and extracts of coca leaves from which cocaine, ecgonine, and derivatives of ecgonine or their salts have been removed;
(II) cocaine, its salts, optical and geometric isomers, and salts of isomers;
(III) ecgonine, its derivatives, their salts, isomers, and salts of isomers; or
(IV) any compound, mixture, or preparation which contains any quantity of
any of the substances referred to in subclauses (I) through (III);
(iii) 280 grams or more of a mixture or substance described in clause (ii)
which contains cocaine base;
(iv) 100 grams or more of phencyclidine (PCP) or 1 kilogram or more of a
mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of phencyclidine (PCP);
(v) 10 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable
amount of lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD);
(vi) 400 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable
amount of N-phenyl-N- [ 1- ( 2-phenylethyl ) -4-piperidinyl ] propanamide or
100 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount
of any analogue of N-phenyl-N-[1-(2-phenylethyl)-4-piperidinyl] propanamide;
(vii) 1000 kilograms or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable
amount of marihuana, or 1,000 or more marihuana plants regardless of weight;
(viii) 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, its salts, isomers, and salts of its
isomers or 500 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine, its salts, isomers, or salts of its isomers;
such person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which may not be
less than 10 years or more than life and if death or serious bodily injury results
from the use of such substance shall be not less than 20 years or more than life
. . . . If any person commits such a violation after a prior conviction for a felony drug offense has become final, such person shall be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment which may not be less than 20 years and not more than life imprisonment and if death or serious bodily injury results from the use of such
substance shall be sentenced to life imprisonment . . . . If any person commits
a violation of this subparagraph . . . after two or more prior convictions for a
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and § 841(b)(1)(A) deals with the highest-end quantities of drugs. The basic
sentence under § 841(b)(1)(A) is a ten-year mandatory minimum.161 However, the statute also provides for various enhancements. The provision of immediate concern imposes a mandatory LWOP sentence if the defendant has
“two or more prior convictions for a felony drug offense.”162 This provision
might thus be conceived as a sort of three-strikes law for drug offenders and,
as a matter of convenience, this Part will refer to the provision this way.
What seems most notable about the three-strikes law is its authorization
of LWOP sentences for a class that I will call “drug-only” offenders; that
is, offenders never convicted of a conventional violent or other non-drug
crime and whose instant offense does not involve any proven actual injury,
intent to injure, or threat of injury (except, of course, to the extent that
drug use may be thought of as intrinsically injurious). The drug-only offender thus stands in marked contrast to the image of the hyperviolent gangster
that figures so prominently in depictions of drug traffickers in popular culture
and political rhetoric.
The questions for consideration now are whether the Eighth Amendment
permits LWOP sentences for drug-only offenders and, if so, whether such
sentences may be imposed on a mandatory basis and without regard to any
individualized mitigating circumstances the offender has to offer.163

B. Substantive Constitutionality: The Graham Claim
The substantive Eighth Amendment claim would go something like this:
the drug-only three-strikers have culpability that is at least twice diminished
because they are not only free of the taint of homicide, but are also innocent
of any violence. Such multiple-diminution in culpability leaves them unfit
for LWOP, which is no more than once diminished relative to the most severe
penalty. Before evaluating this categorical-proportionality argument, however, one should first assess the various conditioning considerations.

1. Conditioning Considerations
a. Deference
Deference considerations provide little support for imposing LWOP on
drug-only offenders. Consider frequency of the sentence first. Life sentences
felony drug offense have become final, such person shall be sentenced to a
mandatory term of life imprisonment without release . . . .

21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (2012).
161. Id.
162. § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii).
163. A few three-strikes defendants have already tried, without success, to raise
Eighth Amendment claims similar to what I propose in lower courts. See, e.g., United
States v. Ousley, 698 F.3d 972 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied. 133 S. Ct. 1480 (2013).
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for drug trafficking offenses are hardly routine, although they may be more
common than the juvenile LWOP sentences at issue in Graham and Miller.
At the end of 2010, there were 2,472 defendants in federal prison on life
terms for drug trafficking offenses.164 This is a substantial number, but it is
only a small percent of the total 96,829 federal drug-trafficking inmates. The
disparity is even more marked in the annual sentencing data: out of 24,411
federal drug-trafficking sentences imposed in 2010, only 124 were for life.165
Of course, some of those sentences were likely based on death or violence
considerations166 – considerations that are ruled out in our hypothetical claim
challenging the application of § 841(b)(1)(A) to drug-only offenders.167

164. Federal sentencing statistics can be obtained on-line through the interactive
research tool provide by the United States Department of Justice Bureau of Justice
Statistics. See Fed. Justice Statistics Res. Ctr., The Federal Criminal Case Processing Statistics, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/fjsrc/ (last visited
Nov. 13, 2013) (data available for the years 1998-2010). Since parole release was
abolished prospectively in the federal system by the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,
see 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3586 (1985), all or nearly all of the life terms being served
today for drug offenses are likely of the LWOP variety. See Fed. Justice Statistics
Res. Ctr., supra. Note that not all of the 2,472 drug-trafficking lifers necessarily received mandatory life terms, or were sentenced under the three-strikes provisions of §
841(b)(1)(A). See infra note 167.
165. See id.
166. Discretionary life sentences are authorized by section 841(b)(1)(A)(viii) for
all drug-trafficking offenses that meet the quantity thresholds, and are required in
some cases in which “death or serious bodily injury results from the use” of the trafficked substance. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii) (2012).
167. One analysis of federal sentences imposed from 1999 to 2012 provides some
more precise insight into the frequency of LWOP for drug-only offenders. Paul Hofer
has compiled the relevant information from United States Sentencing Commission
data. Email from Paul Hofer, Policy Analyst, Federal Public and Community Defenders, to the Author (Jan. 26, 2014) (on file with the Missouri Law Review). He
finds 2,114 life sentences for drug offenders in all, and 828 receiving life terms who
were convicted under statutory provisions that mandate LWOP. Of the 828, at least a
couple dozen seem clearly outside my drug-only category: twenty-nine were sentenced under Part 2A of the federal sentencing guidelines, which deals with murder
and other crimes against the person, and one received an adjustment for violence or
credible threats of violence. Additionally, Hofer’s data highlight a couple of grayarea categories. First, in eleven of the cases, there were indications that death or serious bodily injury resulted from the drug, even though Part 2A of the guidelines was
not invoked. It is likely that most or all of these cases involved accidental overdoses,
and it is at least arguable that deaths of that sort are not sufficient to raise an offense
into the highest culpability category. Second, 264 of the offenders received an adjustment or conviction indicating the involvement of a weapon in the offense. However, it appears that the great majority of these cases involved simple possession of a
weapon, and not demonstrated brandishing or use. Again, an argument could be
made that these cases are best thought of as nonviolent, drug-only cases.
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State-court sentences should also be considered to determine frequency.
Pertinent state data are harder to obtain but appear consistent with the federal
data. For instance, one study estimated that only about sixteen percent –
or approximately 11,000 – of the 70,000 lifers in the United States from 1988
to 2001 are serving time for drug-trafficking offenses.168 However, the study
did not distinguish between life with and without the possibility of parole.
If the count were limited to true LWOP sentences, the number would surely
be much lower, and would be smaller still if the count were limited to drugonly offenders.
Similar infrequency is also suggested by the felony sentencing data from
large urban counties. One study of 2006 data found that only forty-seven
percent of convicted drug-trafficking defendants received any type of prison
sentence.169 Moreover, among the minority of drug offenders receiving prison sentences, the median length was only two years.170 Out of 1,568 prison
sentences imposed for drug-trafficking felonies, not one was for life and only
five were for more than ten years.171 These five lengthier sentences represented only about .06 percent of the felony defendants in the study who were
arrested on drug-trafficking charges, even though a full fifty percent of arrestees had multiple prior convictions.172 In short, it seems safe to say that
sentences approaching a life term in severity are an extraordinarily rare occurrence among even repeat drug-trafficking offenders. Again, if we could
effectively screen out those with records of violence, the numbers would
probably look even more lopsided.
In addition to infrequent imposition in practice, Graham and Miller also
indicate that inadvertence in authorizing a challenged sentence may diminish
the deference that would normally be shown to legislative policy choices. At
first blush, § 841 may look like the same sort of systematic, graduated, quantity-driven drug-sentencing scheme that the Court approved in Harmelin.
However, there is a difference insofar as the federal three-strikes law is keyed
to prior drug convictions, including convictions obtained under the highly
varied and dynamic drug laws of the fifty states. There may be potential for
three-strikers with relatively innocuous prior convictions – particularly those
suffered under idiosyncratic state laws adopted after the three-strikes provision first appeared in 1986 – to assert inadvertence; that is, that their criminal
histories were beyond Congress’s contemplation in approving § 841(b)(1)(A).
Then, too, there is considerable evidence of legislative inadvertence in
setting the threshold quantity levels in § 841(b)(1)(A). Although Congress
168. See Adam Liptak, To More Inmates, Life Term Means Dying Behind Bars,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/02/national/02life.
web.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
169. THOMAS H. COHEN & TRACEY KYCKELHAHN, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE,
FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 2006, 12 tbl.12 (2010).
170. Id. at 13 tbl.13.
171. Id. at 27 app. tbl.10.
172. Id. at 5 tbl.4.
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intended to target “major” traffickers with this provision, a 2011 study by the
United States Sentencing Commission (the Commission) found no strong
correlation between the quantity thresholds and actual drug-trafficking
roles.173 The Commission concluded that its “analysis suggests that the mandatory minimum penalties for drug offenses may apply more broadly than
Congress may have originally intended.”174 The conclusion serves as a reminder that the § 841 mandatory minimums were adopted in 1986 in a fit of
election-year, antidrug hysteria that developed in the wake of the cocainerelated death of a college basketball star and without the benefit of committee
hearings.175 Indeed, the new mandatory minimums preempted the sentencing
guidelines system that Congress itself created just two years earlier.176 Moreover, one of the threshold quantities – that for crack cocaine – was subjected
to intense, compelling criticism for many years, finally resulting in reform
legislation in 2010.177 In short, it would be hard to say that the 1986 AntiDrug Abuse Act, as the controlling opinion in Harmelin said of the 650 lifer
law, was “calibrated with care, clarity, and much deliberation . . . .”178
Outside of the federal system, it appears that only twelve states authorize LWOP for drug-only offenders, which is considerably fewer than the
thirty-nine states whose laws were overturned by Graham.179 International
legal norms may also increasingly cut against LWOP. For instance, most
European nations have rejected LWOP as a sentencing option and those that
permit the sentence use it quite sparingly.180 Moreover, pronouncements by
various European legal authorities have cast considerable doubt on the
legality of even limited uses of LWOP.181 Most recently, in July 2013 the
Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights ruled in Vinter v.
United Kingdom:

173. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM
PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 168-69 (2011), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Congressional_Testimony_and_
Reports/Mandatory_Minimum_Penalties/20111031_RtC_PDF/Chapter_08.pdf.
174. Id. at 169.
175. TED GEST, CRIME AND POLITICS: BIG GOVERNMENT’S ERRATIC CAMPAIGN
FOR LAW AND ORDER 116-22 (2001).
176. Id. at 121-22.
177. Ronald F. Wright, Portable Minimalism in Sentencing Politics, 2011
CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 9, 15-17.
178. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1008 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment).
179. The Appendix provides a list of these twelve states along with relevant statutory references.
180. Dirk Van Zyl Smit, Outlawing Irreducible Life Sentences: Europe on the
Brink?, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 39, 40-41 (2010).
181. Id. at 41-44.
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[I]n the context of a life sentence, Article 3 [of the European
Convention on Human Rights, barring “inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment”] must be interpreted as requiring reducibility of the sentence, in the sense of a review which allows
the domestic authorities to consider whether any changes in the
life prisoner are so significant, and such progress towards rehabilitation has been made in the course of the sentence, as to
mean that continued detention can no longer be justified on legitimate penological grounds.182
In sum, while the deference factors may not cut quite as strongly against
the sentence at issue here as they did in Graham – in that the frequency of the
sentence may be a bit higher, the legislative inadvertence less facially manifest, and the contrary international norm less firmly established – the analogy
to Graham may nonetheless be close enough to warrant some heightening of
the judicial scrutiny of § 841(b)(1)(A). These factors may also arguably
serve to distinguish Harmelin, in which contrary international norms were not
considered (and, for that matter, were not as well developed as they are now
in light of Vinter and other recent decisions183) and in which the legislature
was found to have acted with such care and deliberation.

182. Vinter v. U.K., Nos. 66069/09, 130/10 & 3896/10, HUDOC, para. 119 (Eur.
Ct. H.R. 2013) (Eur.), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/webservices/content/pdf/001-122664?TID=bnhdrclhla. At the same time, the Grand Chamber did not
indicate that the required review must be judicial, but expressly recognized the possibility that executive review might comply with Article 3 . Id. at para. 120. It is thus
possible that U.S. LWOP sentences might be acceptable under the reasoning of Vinter
based on the existence of a gubernatorial pardoning power. Cf. id. at para. 55 (noting
House of Lords decision suggesting as much). However, a merely theoretical possibility of executive clemency may be insufficient to save a life sentence . For instance,
in Vinter itself, the Grand Chamber found the system of whole-life sentences in England and Wales to be in violation of Article 3 notwithstanding the government’s argument that the Secretary of State had legal authority to release even whole life prisoners when there was no longer any legitimate penological reason for holding them .
Id. at para. 129. The Grand Chamber found the “lack of clarity” about the availability
of review and release to be unacceptable. Id. The court also indicated that it must be
concerned with the law “as it is applied in practice to whole life prisoners.” Id. at
para. 126. “[F]or a life sentence to remain compatible with Article 3, there must be
both a prospect of release and a possibility of review.” Id. at para. 110. Clemency in
some or most jurisdictions may fall short of these ideals. Cf. Solem v. Helm, 463
U.S. 277, 301-03 (1983) (“Commutation . . . is an ad hoc exercise of executive clemency. A governor may commute a sentence at any time for any reason without reference to any standards. . . . In South Dakota, commutation is more difficult to obtain
than parole. . . . In fact, no life sentence has been commuted in over eight years.”).
183. Vinter supplies a lengthy summary of relevant European, international, and
comparative law.
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b. Aversion to LWOP and Permanent Social Exclusion
The Court’s aversion to LWOP – which stems from its sense that
LWOP is not merely the endpoint on a continuum of sentences but is qualitatively different from any other prison term and is analogous in some respects
to the death penalty – should support categorical, prophylactic rulings against
three-strikes sentences under § 841(b)(1)(A) to the extent that the proportionality analysis points to a significant likelihood that such sentences are excessive. There is language in Miller, and to a lesser extent Graham, suggesting
that the Court’s LWOP-aversion is particularly strong as to juveniles.184
However, this does not preclude the existence of heightened concerns regarding adult LWOP, and a bright-line distinction in this area would be hard to
justify. The symbolic, moral significance of an LWOP sentence, with its
categorical rejection of the possibility of reform and atonement, seems equally harsh at any age.185
While the raw number of years served by a juvenile condemned
to LWOP will, on average, be greater than the number of years served by
an adult, a focus on number of years alone misses the significance of
the Court’s treatment of LWOP as a qualitatively unique sentence. Moreover, many adults convicted under § 841(b)(1)(A) may be relatively young
themselves and still face decades of incarceration.186 It is not clear that
there is a significant experiential difference between fifty years of hopelessness and forty years of hopelessness, especially in light of the psychological
literature on adjustment to prison, which indicates that the first year tends
to be the hardest.187

2. Categorical Proportionality
An analysis of the conditioning considerations suggests viability to our
hypothetical Graham claim. We have yet to determine, however, if there
really is a categorical mismatch between the seriousness of the offense and
the severity of the punishment. Following Graham’s lead, this requires an

184. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 130
S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010).
185. If we take seriously the analogy in Graham between the death penalty and
the living death of LWOP, then age at time of the offense should not matter much –
the Court’s death penalty jurisprudence has never suggested that the death penalty is
somehow a less severe penalty for constitutional purposes if it is imposed on an older
person who has already had a good opportunity to enjoy life.
186. Most federal drug-trafficking defendants sentenced to life in prison are under
age forty at the time of commitment, and a substantial minority is under age thirty.
Fed. Justice Statistics Res. Ctr., supra note 164.
187. For a summary of the research, see John Bronsteen et al., Happiness and
Punishment, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037, 1047-49 (2009).
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assessment of both the culpability-diminution relative to adult homicide and
the penalty-diminution relative to the death penalty.
a. Culpability-Diminution
The greatest difficulty facing the Graham claim may be Harmelin and
the controlling opinion’s treatment of high-volume drug trafficking as a sort
of violent crime analogous in its severity to felony murder. Indeed, the invocation of felony murder, with its implicit determination of extreme recklessness relative to human life,188 suggests that the § 841(b)(1)(A) three-strikers
may not even have once diminished culpability. On the other hand, extreme
recklessness is not quite the same thing as intent to kill, and in other Eighth
Amendment settings the Court rejected the proposition that all felony murderers should be indiscriminately categorized with the worst of the worst.189
Let us assume, then, that drug-only offenders have a level of culpability that
is at least once diminished.
Further diminution seems problematic; again, the controlling opinion in
Harmelin squarely rejected the defendant’s argument that his crime was nonviolent.190 Of course, there may be some drug-only three-strikers who are
juveniles or who otherwise possess characteristics that categorically diminish
culpability, such as mental retardation or severe mental illness.191 These subclasses of three-strikers might be able to establish categorical disproportionality even if others could not. However, if one focuses on just unimpaired,
adult three-strikers, Harmelin presents a real difficulty.
There are at least two plausible responses to the Harmelin problem (in
addition, of course, to the possibility that Harmelin may be distinguished on
the basis of the deference considerations). First, the controlling opinion’s
treatment of high-volume cocaine-trafficking as a crime of violence may have
188. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(1)(b) (2013) (“Such recklessness and [extreme] indifference [to the value of human life] are presumed if the actor is engaged
or is an accomplice in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after
committing or attempting to commit [one of several listed felonies].”).
189. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982) (“[I]t is for us ultimately to
judge whether the Eighth Amendment permits imposition of the death penalty on one
such as Enmund who aids and abets a felony in the course of which a murder is committed by others but who does not himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing
take place or that lethal force will be employed. We have concluded, along with most
legislatures and juries, that it does not.”).
190. It should be noted that, Harmelin notwithstanding, there are serious questions
as to whether and under what circumstances drug dealing can be considered the sort
of public wrong that warrants any criminal punishment. Michael M. O’Hear, Drug
Treatment Courts as Communicative Punishment, in RETRIBUTIVISM HAS A PAST:
HAS IT A FUTURE? 234, 246-47 (Michael Tonry ed., 2011).
191. Elsewhere in this Symposium, William Berry discusses a number of the
offender characteristics that might be analogized to juvenile status. William W. Berry
III, Eighth Amendment Differentness, 78 MO. L. REV. 1053, 1077 (2013).
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been premised on the particular social realities of 1991. The late 1980s and
early 1990s were indeed an extraordinarily violent time in American history,
and much of the violence was particularly associated with the distribution of
crack cocaine.192 Public fears led Congress to adopt a draconian new sentencing regime for crack in 1986 and to make it even harsher in 1988.193
Indeed, the Harmelin controlling opinion made much of the contemporary
data establishing what it labeled a “direct nexus between illegal drugs and
crimes of violence.”194
The world, however, has changed since 1991. The crack epidemic abated195 and criminal violence more generally plummeted.196 In public opinion
surveys, mentions of drugs as the nation’s top problem peaked in 1990
and then fell dramatically.197 Thus, while the dangerousness of cocaine trafficking in 1991 may have warranted the Court’s treatment of the offense as
a violent one, the experience of the ensuing two decades may have undermined the factual basis of the Court’s decision. Certainly, there seems
nothing inherently violent about trafficking in addictive psychoactive substances – for example, one does not think of Starbucks, Anheuser-Busch, or
Philip Morris as violent organizations, despite what one may think about the
products they peddle.
What makes drug dealing arguably a violent activity is the particular social circumstances in which it takes place; if those circumstances change, then
our evaluation of the violent character of the activity may also change. In
that sense, a reaffirmation of the legal principles articulated by the Harmelin
controlling opinion does not necessarily imply that the Court would or should
adhere to the view that possession of more than 650 grams of cocaine today is
the moral equivalent of a serious crime of violence like felony murder.
Second, even if the Court continues to believe that the specific drug
crime at issue in Harmelin remains properly characterized as violent, that
would not necessarily justify a similar characterization for all of the drug
offenses covered by § 841(b)(1)(A); there might be subclasses of §
841(b)(1)(A) offenders who can claim protection under Graham, even if the
cocaine offenders cannot. After all, the controlling opinion in Harmelin itself
carefully qualified its conclusions based on the dangers associated with “this
192. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE GREAT AMERICAN CRIME DECLINE 81 (2007)
(quoting Alfred Blumstein, The Recent Rise and Fall of American Violence, in THE
CRIME DROP IN AMERICA 1, 39 (Alfred Blumstein & Joel Wallman eds., 2000)).
193. GEST, supra note 175, at 120-22.
194. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1003 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring
in part and concurring the judgment).
195. ZIMRING, supra note 192, at 75.
196. Id. at 5-7.
197. PRINCETON SURVEY RESEARCH ASSOCIATES INTERNATIONAL FOR THE
NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, THE NSCS SENTENCING ATTITUDES SURVEY:
A REPORT ON THE FINDINGS 13 (2006), available at http://ncsc.contentdm.oclc.org/
cdm/ref/collection/criminal/id/132.
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large an amount of cocaine.”198 A different amount of a different drug might
call for a much different analysis.
For instance, § 841(b)(1)(A) mandates LWOP for three-strikers who
manufacture or distribute 1,000 kilograms of any mixture containing a detectable amount of marijuana or 1,000 marijuana plants regardless of weight.199
Marijuana is, of course, quite a different drug than cocaine – it is consumed
much more frequently by Americans and is not particularly associated with
violence and some of the other pathologies associated with so-called hard
drugs.200 Indeed, twenty states and the District of Columbia have approved
its use for medical purposes,201 two states recently legalized its recreational
use,202 various other jurisdictions are known for high levels of official toleration,203 and fifty percent of Americans support its legalization.204 Given this
degree of social acceptance, it is a mistake to assume uncritically that Harmelin’s characterization of cocaine trafficking as a violent crime would or
should also apply to marijuana trafficking.205 It is possible that similar distinctions could also be made with respect to LSD, another drug that is covered by § 841(b)(1)(A).
Even as to some of the harder drugs on the § 841(b)(1)(A) list, the quantity thresholds may be too low to justify equation with the quantity of cocaine
at issue in Harmelin, a quantity that the controlling opinion assumed to be

198. 501 U.S. at 1003 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment).
199. For information about a number of individuals currently serving LWOP

sentences for nonviolent marijuana offenses, although not necessarily sentenced under
the law at issue here, see LIFE FOR POT: RELEASE NON-VIOLENT MARIJUANA
PRISONERS, http://www.lifeforpot.com/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2013).
200. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, MARIJUANA AND MEDICINE: ASSESSING THE
SCIENCE BASE 95, 125-27 (Janet E. Joy et al. eds., 1999).
201. Monique Garcia & John Keilman, It Could Be Next Fall Before First Pot
Clinics Open, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 2, 2013), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-0802/news/chi-quinn-to-sign-medical-marijuana-bill-thursday-20130731_1_pot-storesmedical-marijuana-card-law.
202. See NICOLE D. PORTER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, THE STATE OF
SENTENCING 2012: DEVELOPMENTS IN POLICY AND PRACTICE 3 (2013), available at
http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/sen_State%20of%20Sentencing%20201
2.pdf (noting legalization in Colorado and Washington).
203. See, e.g., Adam Nagourney, Marijuana, Not yet Legal for Californians,
Might as Well Be, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/12/21/us/politics/stigma-fading-marijuana-common-in-california.html?page
wanted=1&_r=0.
204. Frank Newport, Record-High 50% of Americans Favor Legalizing Marijuana Use, GALLUP POL. (Oct. 17, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/150149/recordhigh-americans-favor-legalizing-marijuana.aspx.
205. Marijuana may also be distinguishable from other drug offenses by reference
to the deference considerations. For instance, only nine states authorize LWOP for
marijuana offenses. See infra Appendix.

File: O’Hear – Final Formatting 3/13/14

2013]

Created on: 3/19/2014 8:58:00 AM

NOT JUST KID STUFF?

Last Printed: 3/19/2014 8:59:00 AM

1133

capable of producing upwards of 65,000 doses.206 For instance, the threshold
for methamphetamine is only fifty grams207 with common abuse dosages in
the range of 0.1 to one gram per day.208 This suggests a wide disparity relative to the volume of cocaine assumed to be at issue in Harmelin.
Thus, there are plausible grounds for distinguishing Harmelin with respect to offense severity – on the basis of changed social circumstances since
1991, or on the basis of differences between some of the specific offenses
covered by § 841(b)(1)(A) and Harmelin’s offense – and thereby finding a §
841(b)(1)(A) offense diminished in culpability relative to homicide. However, an additional difficulty remains for the Graham claim: the three-strikes
provision at issue requires the presence of a criminal history, which is relevant to proportionality under Ewing.
On the other hand, Ewing does not indicate that all criminal history
should be treated as equally grave or that the existence of some criminal history automatically opens up any possible sentence, no matter how severe. To
the contrary, Ewing left intact the Court’s earlier decision in Solem v. Helm,
in which the Court overturned an LWOP sentence for a minor offense notwithstanding the defendant’s extensive history of prior convictions.209 Thus,
the Ewing plurality did not declare that prior convictions per se justified a
sentence of twenty-five years to life, but instead emphasized the particularities of Ewing’s “long, serious criminal record.”210
It may thus be possible for some § 841(b)(1)(A) three-strikers to show
that their criminal histories are distinguishable from Ewing’s. The Ewing
plurality emphasized that the state “was entitled to place upon Ewing the onus
of one who is simply unable to bring his conduct within the social norms
prescribed by the criminal law of the State.”211 This echoes the concern in
Graham and Miller with whether a defendant has shown “evidence of irretrievable depravity.”212 In order to offset culpability-diminution, a criminal
history may need to be sufficiently grave so as to justify a conclusion along
the lines of what the plurality reached in Ewing.
Given the breadth of criminal history that may trigger mandatory LWOP
under § 841(b)(1)(A), there may well be many cases that fall short of a
Ewing-type record under the statute. Consider the plurality’s characterization
206. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1002 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring
and concurring in the judgment).
207. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii) (2012).
208. Drugs and Human Performance Fact Sheets: Methamphetamine (and Amphetamine), NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., http://www.nhtsa.gov/People/
injury/research/job185drugs/methamphetamine.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2013).
209. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
210. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 30 (2003) (plurality opinion).
211. Id. (alteration omitted) (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 284
(1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
212. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

File: O’Hear – Final Formatting 3/13/14

1134

Created on: 3/19/2014 8:58:00 AM

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

Last Printed: 3/19/2014 8:59:00 AM

[Vol. 78

of this record: “Ewing has been convicted of numerous misdemeanor and
felony offenses, served nine separate terms of incarceration, and committed
most of his crimes while on probation or parole. His prior ‘strikes’ were serious felonies including robbery and residential burglaries.”213 By contrast, a §
841(b)(1)(A) three-striker need not have nine prior terms of incarceration;
indeed, it is possible to trigger mandatory LWOP without any prior term of
incarceration. Likewise, a § 841(b)(1)(A) three-striker need not commit any
offenses while on probation or parole. Finally, a § 841(b)(1)(A) three-striker
need not have committed any prior offenses where the gravity approaches
that of robbery, a violent crime, or residential burglary – any felony drug
offense from any state counts, regardless of how draconian or idiosyncratic a
state’s drug laws are.
For instance, in United States v. Rivera-Rodriguez, the defendant’s
strikes were all for the crime of simple possession.214 In United States v.
Millard, a defendant’s LWOP sentence was based, in part, on a prior conviction in Iowa for the crime of sponsoring a gathering with knowledge that a
controlled substance would be distributed, used, or possessed at the gathering.215 Crimes such as these are not persuasive evidence of “irretrievable
depravity”216 or a “simpl[e inability] to bring [one’s] conduct within the social norms prescribed by the criminal law of the State.”217
More generally, as indicated above, the loss-of-mitigation theory of
criminal history indicates that prior convictions are most relevant when they
are recent and involve crimes that are similar to the current offense.218 Similarly, crimes that are too closely connected with one another may also lack
independent moral significance. Yet the crude strike-counting mechanism of
§ 841(b)(1)(A) does not take into account any of these considerations. For
instance, in United States v. Beckstrom, the Tenth Circuit indicated that two
prior convictions could count against a defendant even though both were part
of a single continuing course of conduct.219 Likewise, in United States v.
Hudacek the defendant received a mandatory life term based on a twentyyear-old prior conviction.220 In sum, even though some § 841(b)(1)(A) threestrikers may have criminal histories that bear on culpability in important
ways, there are other identifiable subclasses or individual defendants whose
records are quite distinguishable from Ewing’s and do not provide a convincing basis for enhancing culpability.
Ewing, 538 U.S at 30 (plurality opinion).
617 F.3d 581, 609 (1st Cir. 2010).
139 F.3d 1200, 1209 (8th Cir. 1998).
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).
217. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 30 (plurality opinion) (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445
U.S. 263, 284 (1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
218. See supra Part III.A.2.
219. 647 F.3d 1012 (10th Cir. 2011).
220. 24 F.3d 143 (11th Cir. 1994).
213.
214.
215.
216.
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Criminal history may come into play in the Eighth Amendment analysis
by a route other than culpability-assessment. Graham did not reject the relevance of incapacitation as a legitimate objective of the criminal-justice system. An extensive criminal history will often serve as a reliable indicator of a
propensity to recidivate and thus justify a longer sentence for incapacitation
purposes than might otherwise be suitable. Yet Graham also stated, “Incapacitation cannot override all other considerations, lest the Eighth Amendment’s rule against disproportionate sentences be a nullity.”221
The Court thus seems to indicate that where there is a marked disconnect between culpability and sentence, the evidence for offsetting incapacitation benefits must be quite strong. Yet, the cases of concern here – cases of
multiply-diminished culpability in the current offense and relatively nonserious criminal history – are not apt to offer much by way of demonstrable
incapacitation benefits. It is quite doubtful, moreover, whether such a long
and inflexible sentence as LWOP can ever be justified on incapacitation
grounds, given the very low recidivism rates of elderly ex-convicts.222
b. Penalty-Diminution
How severe should we regard the LWOP penalty provided by §
841(b)(1)(A)? There is the intriguing possibility, suggested by Miller and
noted above, that the de facto phasing out of the American death penalty
means that LWOP sentences should now be regarded as the most severe punishment for Eighth Amendment purposes.223 If that premise is accepted, then
LWOP for a drug-only crime would have great difficulty surviving proportionality review.
However, assume the Court maintains the view articulated in Graham
that LWOP is merely “the second most severe penalty permitted by law.” 224
As discussed above, Miller’s indications of an even closer “correspondence”
between LWOP and the death penalty may be limited to the particularities of
juvenile LWOP.225 If that is correct, then § 841(b)(1)(A) defendants would
seemingly have to demonstrate that their culpability is at least twice diminished in order to establish a Graham violation. Such a claim runs into the
Scylla and Charybdis of Harmelin and Ewing. Yet, for the reasons suggested
above, the difficulties may not be impossible to overcome, particularly as to
221. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2029 (2010).
222. Ashley Nellis, Throwing Away the Key: The Expansion of Life Without Pa-

role Sentences in the United States, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 27, 28-29 (2010); see also
Berry III, supra note 108, at 1132-35 (presenting reasons to doubt incapacitation and
deterrence benefits from LWOP sentences).
223. See supra Part II.B.3.
224. 130 S. Ct. at 2027 (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001
(1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring and concurring in the judgment)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
225. See supra Part II.B.3.
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various discrete subclasses of § 841(b)(1)(A) defendants – for instance, marijuana defendants whose criminal history does not satisfy the criteria for loss
of mitigation. And, of course, it remains possible to distinguish Harmelin
and Ewing on the basis of the conditioning considerations.

C. Procedural Constitutionality: The Miller Claim
Even if LWOP for drug-only three-strikers is not categorically unacceptable under Graham, Miller may nonetheless prohibit the imposition of
LWOP on these offenders on a mandatory basis if the risk of disproportionality in individual cases is too high. It is hard to know where to draw the line
on risk of error but, as discussed above, Miller suggests two distinct types of
factors that may be important.226 First, the analysis may turn on the presence
of a super-mitigator, like juvenile status, that has profound, multifaceted, and
highly individualized implications for culpability that in many cases are apt to
render the sentence at issue disproportionately severe. It is not clear that any
analogous considerations exist with respect to the drug-only three-strikers.227
Second, Miller also suggests that the uniquely harsh character of LWOP
may render the sentence highly disfavored and unlikely to be approved for
any offenders but adult killers, except in very unusual cases. As to other offenders, the facially-suspect nature of the sentence means that its imposition
on a mandatory basis per se creates an unacceptably high risk of error.
Whether or not this reading of Miller has anything to offer § 841(b)(1)(A)
defendants depends on the uncertain question of whether it was LWOP generally or merely juvenile LWOP that provoked the Court’s concerns.
226. See supra Part II.B.3.
227. Perhaps one such consideration would be role in the offense. The federal

sentencing guidelines have long recognized that drug-trafficking organization include
individuals serving in a wide range of different roles, and that those with less responsibility in an organization should generally be treated more leniently than their supervisors. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 3B1.1-3B1.2 (2012). The determination of an offender’s role and its impact on his culpability is often quite factintensive and case-specific. See Kate Stith & José A. Cabranes, Judging Under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1247, 1266-67 (1997) (describing
case law differentiating “minor” and “minimal” participation in the offense). As the
Sentencing Commission’s research has demonstrated, the simple quantity of drugs
attributed to a particular offender is a poor proxy for his role. U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N, supra note 173, at 168. For that reason, although the quantity thresholds of
§ 841(b)(1)(A) are intended to target the organizational big fish, the statute may be
used about as often against medium and small fry. See id. (showing that a little over
eighty percent of high-level suppliers/importers and organizers/leaders are convicted
of crimes carrying mandatory minimums, while over ninety percent of mid-level
managers are, and over sixty-five percent of street-level dealers). Thus, role in the
offense may be similar to juvenile status insofar as it often has a large, mitigating
effect on culpability, but demands individualized assessment in order to determine the
full extent of the mitigation.
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Finally, in considering whether a Miller claim offers stronger prospects
for success than a Graham claim, it may also be important to consider the
deference factors. For instance, the frequency of mandatory LWOP
sentences for drug-only offenders is likely much less than the overall
frequency of LWOP sentences for such offenders.228 Similarly, international
norms against mandatory LWOP are even stronger than the norms against
LWOP generally.229

V. CONCLUSION
There are good arguments in favor of overturning Ewing and Harmelin
but, as long as these decisions remain good law and courts continue to take
them seriously as precedent, they impose substantial obstacles to extending
the protections of Graham and Miller to adults. However, there are at least
some categories of adults – such as marijuana offenders facing LWOP sentences – who should be reasonably well-positioned to distinguish Ewing and
Harmelin, even if they have some prior drug convictions.
As to Ewing, it is important to recognize that the case did not involve an
LWOP sentence, and the Court in Graham and Miller seemed to recognize
that LWOP is qualitatively different for Eighth Amendment purposes from
any other sentence of imprisonment. Because Ewing did not involve an
LWOP sentence, it does not preclude lower courts from adopting categorical,
prophylactic LWOP-limiting rules analogous to what the Court adopted in
Graham and Miller.
Additionally, while Ewing makes clear that criminal history plays an
important role in the Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis, the plurality did not adopt an “anything goes” approach to sentencing recidivists but
instead emphasized the particularly aggravating specifics of Ewing’s own
criminal history. In effect, the plurality concluded that Ewing’s record

228. Only eight states mandate LWOP for any drug-only offenders. See infra
Appendix. See also supra note 167 (indicating that only a minority of life-sentenced
drug offenders have been convicted under statutory provisions that mandate a life
sentence).
229. See, e.g., Van Zyl Smit, supra note 180, at 41 (noting that life sentences in
the Netherlands, while permissible, are never mandatory); Vinter v. U.K., Nos.
66069/09, 130/10 & 3896/10, HUDOC, para. 106 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2013) (Eur.), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/fra/pages/search.aspx?i=001-122664#{"itemid":
["001-122664"]}. (“Contracting States must also remain free to impose life sentences
on adult offenders for especially serious crimes such as murder: the imposition of
such a sentence on an adult offender is not in itself prohibited by or incompatible with
Article 3 or any other Article of the Convention. This is particularly so when such a
sentence is not mandatory but is imposed by an independent judge after he or she has
considered all of the mitigating and aggravating factors which are present in any given case.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)).
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demonstrated what Miller later described as “irretrievable depravity.”230 But
offenders with lesser criminal histories need not necessarily suffer this characterization and its implications for categorical-proportionality review. Finally, Ewing may be distinguishable from some LWOP cases based on deference
considerations, which take into account the number of offenders who received three-strikes sentences like Ewing’s, the number of states with threestrikes laws, the deliberateness of those enactments, and the ongoing shift
away from acceptance of LWOP in international law.
Harmelin may seem at first a more daunting obstacle, with the Court
upholding a mandatory LWOP sentence on a first-time, adult drug offender.
Yet, the controlling opinion was premised on the belief that high-volume
cocaine trafficking was a serious violent crime, comparable to felony murder.
More clearly nonviolent offenses should be readily distinguishable, including
even drug offenses involving lesser quantities of drugs or different types of
drugs. Moreover, the controlling opinion also specifically praised the “care,
clarity, and much deliberation” with which the challenged sentencing statute
was crafted;231 not all LWOP statutes merit such accolades, and lesser deference to the legislature may be warranted where, as in Miller, LWOP was not
adopted “through deliberate, express, and full legislative consideration.”232
Finally, Harmelin himself did not argue that his sentence was inconsistent
with international legal norms, and the Court did not explicitly consider the
possibility; an offender raising the issue today may merit different treatment,
particularly in light of the trend away from LWOP in international law.
Graham and Miller constitute an important breakthrough, with the Court
recognizing for the first time the unique and inhumane character of LWOP as
a punishment. Yet, at the same time, the Court avoided truly sweeping holdings and the express reversal of precedent. The Court’s “go-slow” approach,
reflecting the values of judicial deference, may not be unjustified. But, even
with the reaffirmation of Ewing and Harmelin, the Court’s approach leaves
room for lower courts to begin the process of extending Graham and Miller
and developing principled limitations on the imposition of LWOP on adult
offenders.

230. Miller v. Alabama 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012).
231. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1007-08 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concur-

ring in part and concurring in the judgment).
232. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2473.
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Appendix
Maximum Penalties for Drug Offenses in States
with Life Without Parole Sentences
State

Alabama
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware

Max Penalty for
Drug Only
Offender
LWOP233
Life with Parole236
Life with Parole238
9 Years240
64 Years242
Life with Parole244
LWOP246

LWOP
Mandatory?
Yes234
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
Yes247

Max Penalty for
Marijuana Only
Offender
LWOP235
Life with Parole237
Life with Parole239
4 Years241
64 Years243
25 Years245
LWOP248

233. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-9(c)(4) (2013) (LWOP for habitual felon with Class A
felony); § 13A-12-231 (defining some drug trafficking crimes as Class A felonies).
234. § 13A-5-9(c)(4).
235. Id. (LWOP for habitual felon with Class A felony); § 13A-12-231 (defining
trafficking in cannabis as Class A felony).
236. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3410 (2013).
237. Id.
238. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-4-401(a)(1), 5-4-501(a)-(b), 5-64-440(c) (2013) (trafficking a controlled substance is a Class Y felony).
239. §§ 5-4-401(a)(1), 5-4-501(a)-(b), 5-64-440(c) (trafficking marijuana, a
schedule VI substance, is a Class Y felony).
240. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11352(b) (West 2013).
241. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11360(a).
242. 2013 Colo. Legis. Serv. Ch. 333 (S.B. 13-250) amending COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 18–1.3–401.5 (West 2013) (defining drug felony levels and imprisonment),
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1.3-801 (habitual criminal penalty for level 1 drug felony with three prior felony convictions is sixty-four years imprisonment).
243. 2013 Colo. Legis. Serv. Ch. 333 (S.B. 13-250) amending COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 18–1.3–401.5, 18-1.3-801, 18–18–406(b)(iii)(a) (West 2013) (dispensing
marijuana is a level 1 drug felony at certain aggregate amounts).
244. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21a-278(a) (West 2013).
245. § 21a-278(b).
246. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4214 (b) (West 2012) (LWOP for habitual criminal with specifically enumerated drug felony).
247. Id.
248. Id. (LWOP for habitual criminal with specifically enumerated drug felony);
tit. 16, § 4752(1) (possession with intent to manufacture or deliver a Tier 4 quantity
controlled substance); tit. 16, § 4751C(2) (Tier 4 quantity of Marijuana is four kilograms or more).

File: O’Hear – Final Formatting 3/13/14

1140

Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
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LWOP249
LWOP252
Life with Parole254
LWOP256
Life with Parole258
50 Years260
150 Years262

Yes250
No
N/A
No
N/A
N/A
N/A

249. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 893.135 (West 2013).
250. Id.
251. § 893.135(1) (trafficking in cannabis
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LWOP251
40 Years253
Life with Parole255
LWOP257
Life with Parole259
12 Years261
150 Years263

is 1st degree felony); §
775.084(4)(a)(1) (life sentence for habitual felony offender who commits 1st degree
felony); § 944.275(4)(b) (life sentenced prisoners must serve natural life).
252. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-7(c) (West 2013) (for fourth felony, offender must
serve maximum sentence imposed by judge without parole eligibility); § 16-13-30(d)
(for second or successive conviction for trafficking in controlled substances, judge
may impose life).
253. § 16-13-32.4(b)(2).
254. HAW. REV. STAT. § 706-606.5(1)(c) (West 2013) (life with parole for repeat
offender with Class A felony); § 712-1240.7(2) (methamphetamine trafficking in the
1st degree is a Class A felony).
255. § 706-606.5 (1)(c) (life with parole for repeat offender with Class A felony);
§ 712-1249.4 (commercial promotion or distribution of marijuana in the 1st degree is
a Class A felony).
256. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2514 (West 2013) (person convicted for third time of
felony may be sentenced to life); § 19-2513 (providing judge with discretion to include an indeterminate, parole-eligible portion of sentence).
257. § 19-2514 (person convicted for third time of felony may be sentenced to
life); § 37-2732B(a)(1) (designating trafficking in marijuana as felony).
258. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 570/401(a) (West 2013) (manufacturing or delivering various controlled substances is a Class X felony); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/5-4.5-95(a)(5) (West 2013) (natural life imprisonment for habitual criminal upon
Class X felony conviction with two prior convictions); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/5-8-1(d)(1) (parole and mandatory supervised release for natural life imprisonment).
259. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-4.5-95(a)(5) (natural life imprisonment for
habitual criminal upon Class X felony conviction with two prior convictions); 730
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-8-1(d)(1) (parole and mandatory supervised release for
natural life imprisonment); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 550/5(g) (Class X felony for
manufacture or delivery of cannabis exceeding five kilograms).
260. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-48-4-1(d) (West 2013) (Level 2 felony for dealing in at
least twenty-eight grams of cocaine); § 35-50-2-8(i) (maximum twenty year sentence
enhancement for habitual offender upon level 1 through 4 felony conviction with two
prior unrelated felonies).
261. § 35-48-4-10(c) (Level 5 felony for dealing in at least ten pounds of marijuana); § 35-50-2-8(i) (maximum six year sentence enhancement for habitual offender
upon level 5 or 6 felony conviction with two prior unrelated felonies).
262. IOWA CODE ANN. § 124.401(1)(a) (West 2013) (defining some drug manufacturing and delivery crimes as class B felonies subject to maximum of fifty years
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Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
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34 Years264
Life with Parole266
LWOP268
10 Years271
40 Years273
20 Years275
LWOP277

N/A
N/A
Yes269
N/A
N/A
N/A
Yes278
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34 Years265
Life with Parole267
LWOP270
10 Years272
5 Years274
15 Years276
30 Years279

imprisonment); § 124.411(1) (upon second and subsequent drug convictions, sentencing may be enhanced up to three times the allowable term).
263. § 124.401(1)(a) (marijuana manufacturing and delivery exceeding one thousand kilograms subject to maximum fifty year sentence); § 124.411(1) (upon second
and subsequent drug convictions, sentencing may be enhanced up to three times the
allowable term).
264. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5703(b)(3) (West 2013) (defining drug severity level
1 felony for unlawful manufacturing of controlled substances); § 21-6805(e) (drug
offense sentencing grid with sentence enhancement for prior convictions of unlawful
manufacturing of controlled substances).
265. § 21-5703(b)(2) (defining drug severity level 1 felony for multiple convictions); § 21-6805(e) (drug offense sentence enhancement for prior convictions of
unlawful manufacturing of controlled substances).
266. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 218A.1432(2) (West 2013) (Class A felony for second and subsequent conviction of manufacturing methamphetamine); § 532.080(6)(7) (maximum life imprisonment for first degree persistent felony offender with Class
A or B felony upon third felony conviction).
267. § 218A.1421(4)(b) (Class B felony for trafficking in five or more pounds of
marijuana); § 532.080(6)-(7) (maximum life imprisonment for first degree persistent
felony offender with Class A or B felony upon third felony conviction).
268. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:529.1(A)(3)(b) (2013) (imposing LWOP for third
drug felony punishable by ten years or more); § 40:966(b) (authorizing sentences of
greater than ten years for various drug offenses, including marijuana trafficking).
269. § 15:529.1(A)(3)(b). Louisiana courts do have discretion, however, to impose a lesser sentence if LWOP would be unconstitutionally excessive. Louisiana v.
Sims, 123 So. 3d 806, 814 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2013).
270. § 15:529.1(A)(3)(b).
271. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 1103(1-A)(A) (2006) (trafficking a schedule W
drug is a Class B crime); tit. 17-A, § 1252(A) (ten year maximum for Class B Crime).
272. tit. 17-A, § 1103(1-A)(A) (trafficking twenty or more pounds of marijuana is
a Class B crime); tit. 17-A, § 1252(A) (ten year maximum for Class B Crime).
273. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 5-608(d)(1) (West 2013) (forty year mandatory minimum sentence for fourth-time offender of various narcotics-based crimes);
CRIM. LAW § 5-905(a)(1) (doubles sentence authorized for repeat drug offenders).
274. CRIM. LAW § 5-612(c)(1) (five year mandatory minimum sentence for manufacture or distribution of fifty or more pounds of marijuana); CRIM. LAW § 5905(a)(1) (doubles sentence authorized for repeat drug offenders).
275. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 94C, § 32E(c)(4) (West 2013) (maximum twenty
years imprisonment for trafficking heroine).
276. § 32E(a)(4) (maximum fifteen years imprisonment for trafficking marijuana).
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Minnesota
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Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
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40 Years280
LWOP282
LWOP285
Life with Parole287
Life with Parole289
LWOP291
Life with Parole293
Life with Parole295

N/A
Yes283
No
N/A
N/A
No
N/A
N/A
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40 Years281
LWOP284
LWOP286
Life with Parole288
60 Years290
LWOP292
40 Years294
Life with Parole296

277. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.7401(2)(a)(i)-(iv) (West 2013) (narcotic drug
manufacturing and delivery penalties ranging from less than twenty years to life imprisonment); § 333.7413(1)(a)-(b) (mandatory life sentence for second and subsequent conviction for violation of 333.7401(2)(a)(ii) or (iii)).
278. § 333.7413(1).
279. § 333.7401(2)(d) (maximum fifteen year sentence for marijuana manufacture
or delivery exceeding forty-five kilograms); § 333.7413(2) (sentence doubled for
various second and subsequent drug convictions).
280. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 152.021 (West 2013) (forty year sentence for second of
subsequent conviction of selling various drugs in aggregate amounts).
281. Id.
282. MISS. CODE. ANN. § 41-29-139(f) (West 2013) (mandatory LWOP for drug
manufacture or distribution in aggregate amounts).
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. MO. REV. STAT. § 195.222 (2006).
286. § 195.222(7)(2).
287. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-9-101(3)(a) (2013).
288. § 45-9-101(4).
289. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-416(7) (2013) (defining manufacture or delivery
of cocaine exceeding 140 grams as a Class IB felony); § 28-105 (maximum of life
imprisonment for class IB felonies).
290. § 28-416(12) (defining possession of one pound or more of marijuana as a
Class IV felony); 28-105 (maximum of life imprisonment for class IV felonies); § 292221(1) (maximum of sixty years imprisonment for habitual criminal upon third felony conviction).
291. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 207.010(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through the 2011
76th Regular Session of the Nevada Legislature, and technical corrections received
from the Legislative Counsel Bureau (2012)).
292. Id.
293. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 318-B:26(a)(1)-(4) (2013) (maximum life imprisonment for second or subsequent manufacture of specific drugs various amounts).
294. § 318-B:26(b)(6) (maximum forty years imprisonment for second or subsequent manufacture of marijuana in five pounds or more).
295. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-5(b)(1) (West 2013) (first degree crime for manufacture of heroin at specified amount); § 2C:43-6(f) (second and subsequent convictions for drug manufacturing crimes are subject to extended term); § 2C:43-7(c)
(extended term of life imprisonment for first degree crime under § 2C:43-6(f)).
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26 Years297
25 Years299
23.5 Years301
Life with Parole303
11 Years305
Life with Parole307

N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
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26 Years298
25 Years300
18.5 Years302
20 Years304
8 Years306
Life with Parole308

296. § 2C:35-5(b)(10)(a) (first degree crime for manufacture of marijuana exceeding twenty five pounds); § 2C:43-6(f) (second and subsequent convictions for drug
manufacturing crimes are subject to extended term); 2C:43-7(c) (extended term of life
imprisonment for first degree crime under § 2C:43-6(f)).
297. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-31-20 (B)(2) (West 2013) (first degree felony for
second or subsequent conviction for various manufacture and distribution drug offenses); § 31-18-15 (A)(3) (eighteen years imprisonment for first degree felony); §
31-18-17(C) (eight year sentence increase for habitual criminal with three or more
prior felony convictions).
298. § 30-31-20(B)(2) (first degree felony for second or subsequent conviction for
manufacture of schedules I through V controlled substances); § 30-31-6 (C)(10) (marijuana is a schedule I substance); § 31-18-17(C) (eight year sentence increase for
habitual criminal with three or more prior felony convictions).
299. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.75 (McKinney 2013) (first degree manufacture of
methamphetamine is a class B felony); PENAL LAW § 70.10 (Class A-I felony for
persistent felony offender with third non-violent felony conviction); PENAL LAW §
70.00 (twenty-five year maximum imprisonment for Class A-I felony conviction).
300. PENAL LAW § 221.55 (first degree criminal sale of marijuana is a class C
felony); PENAL LAW § 70.10 (Class A-I felony for persistent felony offender with
third non-violent felony conviction); PENAL LAW § 70.00 (twenty-five year maximum
imprisonment for Class A-I felony conviction).
301. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-95(h)(3b)(c) (West 2013) (trafficking in over 400
grams of methamphetamine is a Class C felony with a maximum 23.5 year sentence).
302. § 90-95 (h)(1)(d) (trafficking in over 10,000 pounds of marijuana is a Class
D felony with a maximum 18.5 year sentence).
303. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 19-03.1-23(1)(a) (West 2013) (defining manufacture or delivery of methamphetamine as a Class A felony); § 12.1-32-09(2)(a) (life
imprisonment for habitual offender with a Class A felony conviction and two Class C
or higher prior felony convictions).
304. § 19-03.1-23(1)(b) (defining manufacture or delivery of marijuana as a Class
B felony); § 12.1-32-09(2)(a) (maximum twenty years for habitual offender with a
Class B felony conviction and two Class C or higher prior felony convictions).
305. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2925.03 (C)(4)(g) (West 2013) (trafficking in over
100 grams of cocaine is a first degree felony); § 2929.14 (A)(1) (maximum of eleven
years for a first degree felony).
306. § 2925.03 (C)(3)(g) (trafficking in over 40 kilograms of marijuana is a second degree felony but can amount to a first degree felony in certain circumstances); §
2929.14 (A)(2) (maximum of eight years for a second degree felony).
307. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2-401(B)(1) (West 2013) (maximum life imprisonment for manufacturing or distributing schedule I or II narcotic drugs).
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10 Years310
20 Years312
Life with Parole314
LWOP317
50 Years319
60 Years321

308. § 2-401(B)(2) (maximum life imprisonment for manufacturing or distributing
schedule I through IV controlled substances); § 2-204 (C)(12) (marijuana is a schedule I substance).
309. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 475.752(1)(a) (West 2013) (manufacture or delivery
of a schedule I controlled substance is a Class A felony); § 161.605(1) (twenty years
imprisonment for a class A felony).
310. § 475.856(2) (manufacture of marijuana is a Class B felony); § 161.605(1)
(ten years imprisonment for a class B felony).
311. 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 780-113(f)(1) (West 2013) (maximum fifteen years
imprisonment for manufacture or delivery of schedule I or II narcotic drug); § 780115(a) (doubled sentence upon second or subsequent convictions under § 780113(a)(30)).
312. § 780-113(f)(1.1) (maximum ten years imprisonment for manufacture or
delivery of over 1,000 pounds of marijuana); § 780-115(a) (doubled sentence upon
second or subsequent convictions under § 780-113(a)(30)).
313. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 21-28-4.01(a)(2) (West 2013) (maximum life imprisonment for manufacture or delivery of schedule I or II controlled substances).
314. § 21-28-4.01.2(a)(3), (b) (maximum life imprisonment for possession, manufacture, or sale of more than five kilograms of marijuana).
315. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-25-45(B)(1), (C)(2)(a)-(b) (2013) (LWOP for
third conviction of serious offense including trafficking controlled substances); § 4453-370(e) (defining trafficking controlled substances with various aggregate amounts
and penalties).
316. § 17-25-45(B).
317. § 17-25-45(B)(1), (C)(2)(a)-(b) (LWOP for third conviction of serious offense including trafficking controlled substances); § 44-53-370(e)(1) (defining trafficking marijuana with various aggregate amounts).
318. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-42-6 (2013) (Class 3 felony to possess more than
ten pounds of marijuana); § 22-7-8.1 (sentence moves up two felony levels upon
fourth non-violent felony conviction); § 22-6-1(4) (maximum fifty years imprisonment for class 1 felony conviction).
319. § 22-42-7 (Class 3 felony to distribute more than one pound of marijuana); §
22-7-8.1 (sentence moves up two felony levels upon fourth non-violent felony conviction); § 22-6-1(4) (maximum fifty years imprisonment for class 1 felony conviction).
320. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-417(j)(1) (West 2013) (Class A felony for manufacture, delivery, or sale of 150 grams or more of heroine); § 40-35-108(a)(2) (career
offender with fourth Class A felony conviction is sentenced under Range III); § 4035-112(c)(1) (maximum sixty years imprisonment with Range III Class A felony
conviction).
321. § 39-17-417(j)(13A) (Class A felony for manufacture, delivery, or sale of
300 pounds or more of marijuana); § 40-35-108(a)(2) (career offender with fourth
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99 Years323
15 Years325
Life with Parole327
Life with Parole329
10 Years331
Life with Parole333
29 Years336

Class A felony conviction is sentenced under Range III);40-35-112(c)(1) (maximum
sixty years imprisonment with Range III Class A felony conviction).
322. HEALTH & SAFETY § 481.112(e) (West 2013) (maximum life imprisonment
for manufacture or delivery of penalty group 1 drugs).
323. HEALTH & SAFETY § 481.120(b)(6) (maximum ninety-nine years imprisonment for manufacture or delivery of marijuana exceeding 2,000 pounds).
324. UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(1)(a), (b)(i) (West 2013) (first degree felony
upon second and subsequent convictions for manufacture or production of schedule I
or II controlled substances); § 76-3-203(1) (maximum life imprisonment for first
degree felony).
325. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), (b)(i) (second degree felony for possession of 100 pounds
or more of marijuana); § 76-3-203(2) (maximum fifteen years imprisonment for second degree felony).
326. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4231(c)(1) (West 2013) (maximum thirty years
imprisonment for trafficking in cocaine at 150 grams or more); tit. 13, § 1 (offenses
with maximum sentences exceeding two years are considered felonies); tit. 13, § 11
(life imprisonment for offender upon fourth or subsequent felony conviction).
327. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 423o(c) (maximum thirty years imprisonment for
trafficking in marijuana at fifty pounds or more); tit. 13, § 1 (offenses with maximum
sentences exceeding two years are considered felonies); tit. 13, § 11 ((life imprisonment for offender upon fourth or subsequent felony conviction).
328. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-248(H)(5) (West 2013) (maximum life imprisonment
for manufacture, sale, or distribution of 100 grams of methamphetamine).
329. § 18.2-248(H)(4)-(5) (maximum life imprisonment for manufacture, sale, or
distribution of 100 kilograms of marijuana).
330. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.50.401(1)-(2)(a) (West 2013) (maximum ten
years imprisonment for Class B felony of manufacture or delivery of schedule I or II
narcotic drugs); § 69.50.408(1) (sentence doubled for various drug offenses upon
second or subsequent convictions).
331. § 69.50.401(2)(c) (maximum five years imprisonment for Class C felony of
manufacture or delivery of schedule I or II controlled substances); § 69.50.204(c)(22)
(marijuana is a schedule I controlled substance); § 69.50.408(1) (sentence doubled for
various drug offenses upon second or subsequent convictions).
332. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 60A-4-401(a)(i) (West 2013) (maximum fifteen years
imprisonment for manufacture or delivery of schedule I or II narcotic drugs); § 61-1118(c) (life with parole upon third conviction of crime “punishable in a penitentiary”).
333. § 60A-4-401(a)(ii) (maximum five years imprisonment for manufacture or
delivery of schedule I, II or III controlled substance); § 60A-2-204 (d)(19) (marijuana
is a schedule I controlled substance); § 61-11-18(c) (life with parole upon third conviction of crime “punishable in a penitentiary”).
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334. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.62(2m) (West 2013) (mandating LWOP for “persistent repeaters,” based on commission of at least three “serious felonies,” and defining
“serious felonies” to include various violations of Chapter 961, Uniform Controlled
Substances Act).
335. Id.
336. § 939.50(3)(e) (setting maximum penalty for Class E felony as fifteen years);
§ 961.41(1)(h)(5) (defining high-volume marijuana trafficking offenses as Class E
felonies); § 961.46 (adding five years to maximum for distribution to minor); §
961.48(1)(b) (adding four years for repeat offense); § 961.49(1m) (adding five years
for distribution in certain protected places).
337. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-7-1031(a)(i) (West 2013) (maximum twenty years
imprisonment for manufacture or delivery of methamphetamine or other schedule I
and II narcotic drugs); § 35-7-1038(a) (sentence doubled upon second or subsequent
conviction for various drug crimes).
338. § 35-7-1031(a)(ii) (maximum ten years imprisonment for manufacture or
delivery of other schedule I and II controlled substances); § 35-7-1014(d)(xiii) (marijuana is a schedule 1 controlled substance); § 35-7-1038(a) (sentence doubled upon
second or subsequent conviction for various drug offenses).
339. D.C. CODE § 48-904.01(a)(2)(A) (2013) (maximum thirty years imprisonment for manufacture or distribution of schedule I and II narcotic or abusive drugs); §
48-904.08(a) (sentence doubled upon second or subsequent conviction for various
drug crimes).
340. § 48-904.01(a)(2)(B) (maximum five years imprisonment for manufacture or
distribution of schedule I, II, or III controlled substances); § 48-902.08(a)(6) (cannabis designated as schedule III substance); § 48-904.08(a) (sentence doubled upon
second or subsequent conviction for various drug crimes).

